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THE FEDERATION OF CENTRAL AMERICA

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CHAPTER I

CAUSES OF FAILURE BEFORE 1823

The history of independent Central America is a record of disunion, although the ideal of federation has never been lost. The conflict between the provinces appearing so early in their history as free states, arouses the suspicion that the seeds of separation were sown during the colonial era.

The study of the period from the Conquest to independence reveals the presence of factors making for disunion.

1. The conflicts of the Conquerors among themselves undoubtedly had its influence upon the future of the countries they vanquished. Mexico was subdued by a sole Conquistador, but on the other hand, the states of Central America were conquered separately. As a result, in their subjugation there was strife between the Conquistadors. The principal reason for the conflict was the two-fold approach; from Mexico at the north, already crushed by Hernandez Cortez; from Panama at the south, forming a part of New Grenada, and governed by Pedro de Arias (Pedrarias). Moreover, there was lack of harmony between those coming from the south, among whom were Gonzales Davila, F. Hernandez de Cordova, Hernando De Soto, and Vasquez de Coronado.

The states uniting in the Captaincy-General of Guatemala, comprising Central America, had boundaries which led to numerous civil wars; probably the strife of the Conquest entered into the blood of the Spaniards who settled there, manifesting itself with each succeeding generation in the spirit of disunion.

2. The tribal grouping of the natives probably hindered the spirit of coöperation, for the territory was not subject to a single prince commanding numerous tributary and allied nations, but independent peoples were governed by caciques, more or less powerful. This lack of unity among the natives made it easy to subdue them in detail. The more barbarous, who inhabited the less desirable parts of the country were left practically unmolested after being confined to the low Atlantic coast lands. These degraded Indians have been the occasion of intrigue and interference on the part of foreign powers, as well as an unassimilative ingredient in the body politic. The other tribes, including those whose type of culture may have been more full of promise than the mongrel type by which it was supplanted, were ruthlessly slaughtered.¹

3. The historical traditions of the Spaniards were another element of the Conquest contributing to disunion. The development of the race was individualistic rather than coöperative. The result of the eight-hundred-year contest between the Spaniards and the Moors was "a race of men devoted primarily to their cities; only secondarily to the province or kingdom, to which their city belonged, and quite incidentally to Spain as a geographical and linguistic unit."² The spirit of a unified government did not throb in the breasts of the Conquistadors, and their descendants in the days of independence would naturally form separate political establishments, for the citizen was still inclined to favor the affairs of his city or district rather than the good of his country. "He found it easier to be loyal to a local chieftain than to the central government."³ One of the reasons why our Constitution has been copied in Central America, while our example has not been followed, is that there are two geniuses and two humanities in this New World "of opposite antecedents and with

¹ Mayer, in *Hist. of the Nations*, v. 22, p. 437. Belly, *A travers l'Am. Cent.*, p. 66. *Bur. of Am. Rep. Bull.*, No. 51, p. 8.

² Bingham, Hiram, *Am. Pol. Sci. R.*, November, 1910, p. 508.

³ Bingham, Hiram, *Am. Pol. Sci. R.*, November, 1910, p. 512.

distinct missions.”⁴ Notwithstanding the individualistic character of the development of the race, all the forces that made for absolutism had operated in Spain, so that, while the political development of the United States was along the line of least resistance—to erect a democratic government—when Latin America established republics, it was against the current which flowed strongly in the direction of a monarchical society.⁵

4. The maladministration of the colonies by the mother country was a serious hindrance to self-government, which the Anglo-American colonies possessed, while the Spanish colonies had neither political self-government or religious liberty. They were governed by a Royal Audiencia, of which the President was both civil chief and Captain-General. This system of monarchical Europe was followed by corruption in state and Church.

Power and wealth rapidly concentrated in the hands of the few, and ignorance and superstition brooded with leaden wings over the minds of the many. A degenerate aristocracy filled the places of the Conquistadors and added the vices of effeminacy and indolence to the crimes of cruelty and oppression.⁶

The ambitions of the descendants of this aristocracy have been a curse of the union of the Central American States. Moreover, the five little provinces under Spanish rule paved the way for the strife of a century, as each province “hoped by trampling on its neighbors to be able to reconstruct the isthmian State to its own advantage.”⁷

5. The inexperience of the citizens in the affairs of government was unfavorable to unified action, for good government could not be expected from a people reared under a system of repression. The Captains-General and Viceroy were all foreigners, some of whom were adventurers of desperate fortunes. Naturally none of them had any

⁴ Abasolo Navarrete, J., *La Personalidad Política y Lat. Am. Del Porvenir*, p. 427.

⁵ See article—The Pan Am. Conf. and Their Significance, *Am. Ann. Soc. and Pol. Sci.*, Suppl. 1906, pp. 17, 18. Moses, B., *Am. Hist. Ass'n Report*, 1907, v. 1, p. 140.

⁶ Squier, *Nic.*, v. 2, p. 349.

⁷ Waleffe, *Fair Land of C. Am.*, p. 138.

permanent interest in the country, nor were they even in sympathy with those whom they governed.⁸ Because of this repression, at the time of their independence, the people were altogether inexperienced in the work of government, as the only voice allowed them had been that of timid petitioners.

The objection may be offered that some of these causes of separation existed also in Mexico; this is true, but it was the conflicts of the Conquistadors and the piece-meal conquest of Central America, with the resulting divisions which provided the fallow field in which these seeds of disunion took root.

In 1787 the Captaincy-General of Guatemala included the thirteen provinces of Soconusco, Chiapas, Suchitepec, San Miguel, Vera Paz, Izaleos, Jerez de la Cholutec, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, San Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.⁹ Although subject to a common rule, the provinces had no real unity. The fact that some of them seemed to have enjoyed a civil and military government of their own would make for disunion when the heavy hand of Spain was removed.

The close of Spanish rule in America was marked by mental, moral, and material stagnation, due in part to the effect of tropical climate on human energies; in part to the prodigality of nature, which allowed no incentive for man to labor; but principally to the lack of self-government, which destroyed activity and enterprise.

The Captaincy-General of Guatemala was almost the last to embrace the cause of liberty as the primitive inhabitants were not subjected to those excesses of grinding despotism which disgraced the conduct of Spain in Peru and New Grenada. More of an agricultural than a mining country, oppression fell upon them in the milder form of agricultural labor, and the Creoles had suffered less misrule than other parts of Spanish America. The Captaincy-General of Guatemala did not acknowledge a very close dependence upon the Viceroyalty of New Spain,

⁸ Scroggs, *Col. and Ven. Repub.*, p. 28.

⁹ Fortier and Ficklen, *C. Am. and Mex.*, p. 113.

under which it was nominally placed.¹⁰ As a result of these peculiar circumstances, the leaven of liberty worked slowly. As late as September 25, 1821, Nicaragua and Costa Rica protested against the revolutionary agitation of Guatemala.¹¹ Central America had received little attention from Spain for nearly three hundred years; the resources were not developed and the population was so scant that no body of soldiers was maintained there. When the rebellion to the north and south of them seemed sure to succeed, the people of Central America declared against the Spanish government. When the outbreak came, the officials were ill-prepared to resist the revolutionary movement.¹² An earlier interest in the revolutionary cause might readily have created a bond of sympathy which would have made for union. The peaceful nature of the revolution in Central America, which most people would regard as a blessing, may have been a curse, and the failure of Federation may be due in part to the absence of a war which would weld the nations into one.¹³

There were several sporadic attempts at armed revolt in Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, but no standard was raised around which a united people could rally. These efforts were isolated, and could not succeed without being extended.¹⁴ They were soon stifled by the royal power, but the sparks were secretly kept alive in these provinces as well as in Honduras. They were long ready for revolt, but were restrained by the inertia of Guatemala without whose aid they could not act. There could be no combination to assure success, for they had been taught by their system of government to distrust others.

¹⁰ *No. Am. Rev.*, January, 1828. Domingo Juarrez, D., Trans. by J. Bailey, *Repub. of C. Am.*

¹¹ Peralta, *Costa Rica y Colombia*, p. 307. La disputacion provincial de Nicaragua y Costa Rica al Secretario de la Gobernacion de Ultramar, protestando contra la agitacion revolucionaria de Guatemala y de su fidelidad a la metropoli. 23 September, 1821.

¹² Sears, E. H., *An Outline of Polit. Growth in Nineteenth Cent.*, p. 490.

¹³ Bailly, *C. Am.*, Pref., V.

¹⁴ Belly, *A Travers l'Am. Centrale*, p. 68. See also *Internationale*, November, 1896, Tommaso Caivano, p. 297.

No leaders appeared to unite the discordant elements. The evolution of a free state was very slow, and at last was as much owing to the supineness of Spain as to any forceful act on the part of the provinces.¹⁵

Without a strong leader, two parties immediately sprang up, making division inevitable. The question of annexation to Mexico was the problem that wrecked the hopes of federation for a year, and prepared the way for ultimate failure.

Iturbide had formulated a plan whereby the idea of monarchy might be preserved in Mexico. The minister from Colombia at Washington, in urging recognition of the South America States upon the attention of the Secretary of State, wrote November 30, 1821,

There has occurred a project in New Spain long since formed, to establish a monarchy in Mexico on purpose to favor the views of the Holy Alliance in the New World.¹⁶

A treaty was actually concluded in the city of Cordova between Senors D. Juan O'Donoju, Lieutenant-General of the Armies of Spain, and D. Augustin de Iturbide, first chief of the Imperial Mexican Army. In this treaty it was stipulated that the government should be a constitutional, limited monarchy. Ferdinand VII, after taking an oath fixing the court and capital of the Empire in Mexico, was to be named as Emperor of the Mexican Empire. Upon his renunciation of the throne, his brother or another of the reigning family should become monarch.¹⁷ With independence achieved, Iturbide himself ascended the throne. The province of Chiapas soon declared itself independent, separated from Guatemala, and became annexed to Mexico.

In Salvador, such confusion followed the declaration of independence in September, 1821, that Guatemala sent representatives who restored peace and presided over the new government. In Honduras, one of the districts de-

¹⁵ Brigham, *Guat.*, p. 283.

¹⁶ *Am. St. Papers*, v. 4., p. 829, 835.

¹⁷ *Am. St. Papers*, v. 4., p. 842.

cided to join Guatemala, while others preferred annexation to Mexico. In Nicaragua, Leon was in favor of union with Mexico and Grenada preferred to send representatives to a Congress at Guatemala. Costa Rica, on October 29, 1821 declared for independence, but did not state her attitude toward the other provinces.¹⁸

In general, the distracting question was whether the provinces should follow Chiapas in becoming a part of Iturbide's New Empire of Mexico, or should act together through a congress at Guatemala, or act separately and prepare for individual territorial independence. Political parties quickly formed as the result of the discussion of these questions; one party adopted republican ideas, while the other developed aristocratic tendencies. A division of sentiment was fostered by one party demanding complete independence from Mexico as well as from Spain, and advocating a federal union of all the Guatemalan provinces; the other adopting the "Plan of Iguala," which provided for a monarchy and the establishment of a Bourbon on the throne of Central America.¹⁹ The Serviles or Imperialists, as the aristocrats were called, favored the immediate acceptance of the offer of Iturbide.

The absorbing question was settled in a summary manner. Undoubtedly, Guatemala in common with other liberated states, having no very definite policy and beset with dangers, felt the need of a strong ally.²⁰ The President of the provisional junta of Guatemala, after consulting the people, and without waiting for the decision of the other provinces, decided on union with Iturbide. On the fifth of January, 1822, annexation was decreed and "the Guatemaltecos were given all the rights of Mexican citizens, including the right to be heavily taxed."²¹ Costa Rica and the greater part of Salvador held aloof after the arbitrary ruling of Guatemala, and the first civil war in Central America was the result. Iturbide sent Filisola, who pene-

¹⁸ Fortier and Ficklen, *C. Am. and Mex.*, p. 128.

¹⁹ Larenandiere, *Guat. in L'univers*, p. 290.

²⁰ Domville-Fife, *Guat. and Sts. of C. Am.*, p. 47.

²¹ Domville-Fife, *Guat. and Sts. of C. Am.*, p. 47.

trated the obstreperous state, Salvador, and after a bloody battle took the capital; but on learning of Iturbide's overthrow, Filisola departed precipitately.²² The union with Mexico continued for fifteen months, when after the fall of the Emperor, Guatemala proclaimed her independence, July 21, 1823.

A consequence of this episode in the troubled history of Central America was the bitter enmity and fierce struggle between the two parties created by it. The immediate failure of federation was the direct result of the antagonism of the two groups—the Aristocrat-conservative—"servile" group, supported by the old Spanish bureaucracy and clergy, and opposed to centralization; and the Democrat-liberal-central group, supported by the Creoles, and upholding federation.²³

The attitude of the United States toward Central America, and indeed the whole of Spanish America during this period, is rather typical of the policy of the nation. It is exemplified by the contemptuous disregard of the futile overtures of Salvador to the United States to assume the protection of the country. Salvador was the Central American state which showed strongest opposition to annexation to Mexico; it was resolved to remain independent until the representatives of the whole people of Central America should decide the question of federation.²⁴ In the Civil War that followed the union with Iturbide, Salvador was beaten in the field, but not conquered by the Serviles. Its provisional Congress, though driven from place to place continued to defy the invaders, and in order to retain its freedom, resolved upon annexation to the United States. By a solemn act on December 2, 1822, it decreed its incorporation with the republic of the North. "It is not known that any action was taken upon the proposal by the American government."²⁵

²² Perigny, *Les Cinq Repub. de L'Am. Centrale*, p. 27. Larenandiere, *Guat. in "L'univers,"* p. 290.

²³ Pector, *Les Richesses de L'Am. Centrale*.

²⁴ *Am. Constitutions*, v. 1, p. 259.

²⁵ Squiers, *Nicaragua*, v. 2, p. 383.

The Mexican Empire fell, and the Central American confederation which had been strongly advocated by the Salvadorean people was organized.

The attitude of the United States at this juncture of Central American affairs was consistent with its position on the question of the recognition of South American independence, which was delayed until 1822, when the Florida Treaty of 1819 was ratified by Spain. Probably the desire of the United States to have Spain ratify that treaty inspired the delay in recognition, for the enthusiasm and eloquence of Clay could not overcome the inertia of the government, and the states had to wait too long for recognition. It was probably the same selfish spirit that guided the United States in its aloofness from the affairs of Central America. Soon after its declaration of independence, two commissioners from Central America visited Washington, but the records of the State Department do not disclose, "any act of the United States involving recognition or the intention to recognize." Not until August 4, 1824, when the President received Mr. Canaz as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, was the new Central American State welcomed into the sisterhood of republics.

The period immediately preceding independence contributed results for the federation of Central America which may be summarized as actual failures of federation, and as foundations laid for future failures.

Spain failed to reorganize the colonial system by the grant of autonomy, and the unification of the provinces; the United States failed to appreciate the opportunity Salvador put in its way, to extend a protectorate over the States of the Isthmus, and Mexico failed in its deliberate attempt to unite the several provinces of Central America. The foundations laid for future failures during this period were, the slow growth of patriotic sentiment, the lack of war as a unifying force, and the absence of dominant leaders such as San Martin and Bolivar.

CHAPTER 2

THE UNITED STATES OF CENTRAL AMERICA, 1823-1842

Regrets have been expressed that Central America separated from Mexico after fifteen months of union, but the history of Mexico does not inspire confidence in her ability to guide the destinies of a greater nation in the attainment of peace and prosperity. The sole result of the union was an exhaustion of the country by numerous heavy taxes, and the separation found the provinces of Central America just where they were at the time of the overthrow of Spanish power. Financial distress, commercial bankruptcy, political chaos, and the absence of intelligent leaders, plunged the land into the period of civil warfare.

A congress of the five states, assembled at Guatemala City on June 24, 1823, was in session nineteen months, closing its labors on January 23, 1824. On July 1, 1823, an ordinance was adopted which declared the provinces to be free and independent states, confederated into a nation under the name of Provincias Unidas del Centro de America.²⁶

A provisional executive composed of three members was elected to be subject to the assembly, but the three well-known liberals who were installed in office, constituted a government devoid of strength. At the same time the abuses of the Mexican army under Filisola caused much bitterness, and the dismissal of all officials appointed by the Spanish or Mexican governments aroused much discontent. The confusion was increased when the unpaid soldiers revolted under the leadership of Captain Rafael Ariza y Torres,²⁷ so that the inefficient executive was forced to resign, and new elections were held. A more troublesome situation arose from the presence of a Salvadorean force, called to help against the revolting soldiers. Against the protests of the Government these Salvadoreans occupied the capital three weeks, pillaging the city and

²⁶ Marure, Bosq., *Hist. Cent. Am.*, v. 1, pp. 13-18.

²⁷ Marure, Bosq., *Hist. Cent. Am.*, v. 1, pp. 102-103.

engaging in street brawls with the soldiers from other provinces.²⁸

The Congress assumed the name of "Asamblea Nacional Constituyente," on July 2, 1823, and a popular, representative, federal form of government was adopted on December 17. Each one of the five states, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, was to have "the same division of powers, and with the same functions in its internal administration as the general government with respect to the whole republic."²⁹ The liberal party which espoused the cause of federation triumphed over the moderate party which stood for centralization, in the discussions of the Assembly, and the Constitution was adopted November 22, 1824, modelled on that of the United States.

The most important laws enacted, emancipated all slaves, made free the slaves of other countries coming to Central America, and prohibited the slave-trade.³⁰

The first constitutional Congress of the States was opened February 6, 1825, at Guatemala City, its principal duties being the election of a President, and the ratification of the Constitution. The former proved a difficult task and was achieved amidst stormy discussions, for the provisional triple executive, elected in 1823, had not been harmonious, as Arce and Valle, the two leading members, had serious differences, which ended in Arce's resignation of the presidency of the Provisional Government. These two men became the leading candidates for the presidency of the Federation, the result of the election being that out of the seventy-nine votes cast, forty-one were for Valle, the candidate of the Moderates. Since forty-two votes were necessary for a choice under the Constitution,³¹ Congress assumed the right of selecting one of these two candidates, and Arce was chosen as a result of a compromise with the

²⁸ Marure, *Efem.*, p. 8.

²⁹ Bancroft, v. 8, p. 75. Marure, Bosq., *Hist. C. Am.*, v. 1, pp. 120-121. Opportunity was given Chiapas to join, if that state should apply for admittance.

³⁰ Marure, Bosq., *Hist. C. Am.*, v. 1, p. 133-135. According to Molina the number of slaves thus emancipated was about one thousand.

³¹ Marure, Bosq., *Hist. C. Am.*, v. 1, pp. 150, 210-211.

Moderates. His vacillating policy aroused dissatisfaction, and in his attempt to please both parties, he succeeded in alienating his former friends among the Liberals. This change of attitude on the part of the President was the real occasion for the Civil War, which was caused by the jealousy of Salvador.

The people of Salvador had long been suspicious that a strong central party existed at Guatemala; they realized that the capital was located in the strongest state, and they charged the President with planning to change the government from the Federal to the central form. During the first session of Congress, in March, 1826, the Salvadorean deputies presenting petitions from the towns of Aguachapam and Metapan in the State of Salvador insisted that the seat of the executive government be removed to some place at least 40 leagues from Guatemala.³²

The regular session of Congress closed in June, and an extraordinary session was summoned to be held at Guatemala, October 1, at which sixteen members were present. As twenty-one were necessary for a quorum, only such business as related to the regular organization could be legally transacted. They discussed the reasons for the non-attendance of the absent members, and took measures to procure their presence, but soon learned that the members from Salvador did not intend to be present. Marcellino Mendez sent in a memorial, in which he registered his determination not to attend, unless Congress convened at some other place, denying that the decree of the Senate in calling the Congress set forth any sufficient cause for such action. The complaint was also made that the question of the removal of the seat of Government, left undecided by the preceding Congress, had been omitted.³³ This document was regarded as a public declaration of the feelings of Salvadoreans for Guatemala, and the legislature of the State of Guatemala immediately authorized the levy of militia under the name of Defenders of the Constitution.

³² Cushing, C., Republic of C. Am. in *N. Am. Rev.* January, 1825, pp. 43-44.

³³ *No. Am. Rev.*, January, 1828, p. 144.

The Members of Congress had continued to meet until October 10, when the President of the Republic although not a Salvadorean ordered an extraordinary Congress to meet at Copilepeque in the State of Salvador. The decree was immediately ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and Congress declared it to be an act of arbitrary power on the part of the President, which they would not observe. Although Guatemala was inclined to yield to the President's decree and elected delegates to the extraordinary Congress, Salvador took the lead in opposing it. Unfortunately, the opposition was not confined to the Constitutional means of resistance, and on October 13, 1826, trouble had arisen between the local and Federal authorities in Guatemala City. Vice-President Flores was murdered by a mob of native women, incited by a Spanish priest, and the murder was followed by a furious outbreak of religious fanaticism, which gave occasion for the Republic of Salvador to send troops to Guatemala for the restoration of order, but their attack on the capital failed, and a desultory war was the disastrous result. "The breath of party spirit fanned the flame of dissension to Civil War."³⁴

After the Salvadorean troops, under the command of General Figuero had been routed at Arrazola, the Guatemalan forces invaded Salvador. The war continued until 1829, when Francisco Morazan, jefe of Honduras entered Guatemala City,³⁵ at the head of two thousand men, after a three-day battle. The Serviles were overthrown and in September, 1830, Morazan was elected President. He treated the federal officials and those of the State of Guatemala who had taken part in the Civil War with much rigor.³⁶

A period of reaction or restoration was at once inaugurated, as the policy of the Servile party which had held undisputed control in Guatemala for several years, was one of intolerance. Morazan was able to maintain the liberal

³⁴ Domville-Fife, *Guat. and Sts. of C. Am.*, p. 47.

³⁵ *For. Rel.*, 1886, p. 63.

³⁶ Marure, *Efem.*, p. 24.

party in power for ten years, and the administration of the republic was vigorous and probably just. The struggle between the clericals and anti-clericals was waged with increasing bitterness, but Morazan did his best to overcome the many complications brought about by the long period of war and disorder.

The Serviles still opposed to centralization made Guatemala the center of their activities and sowed dissension throughout the entire country, the struggle between the two parties only ending with the destruction of the Federation. Nicaragua was persuaded to secede in 1832, Guatemala and Salvador in 1833, and finally, Honduras and Costa Rica seceded,³⁷ so that the Federation was virtually at an end.

The Liberals, however, soon saw the folly of disunion, and the states quietly returned to the Confederacy. The federal Congress attempted to adjust the differences, but the extremely liberal religious policy of the party in power aroused and embittered the clerical opposition, while the Conservative-Serviles stopped at nothing which might in any way help their cause. In 1837, the scourge of cholera appeared in Central America and rapidly spread throughout the towns of the Isthmus. The Serviles in the times of greatest distress hindered the work of stamping out the dread plague in their efforts to end the influence of the Liberals, the ignorant masses being made to believe that the water had been poisoned by the Liberals in order to destroy the natives and make way for foreigners. The incensed mob killed several physicians; finally government troops were called out to put down the uprising. The leader of the mob was Rafael Carrera, who sprang from the lowest ranks of the Indian element. Of Indian and negro parentage, coarse, ignorant, brutal, and vicious, but with an indomitable will, dauntless courage, and a shrewd, cunning audacity,³⁸ Carrera opposed Morazan vigorously.

³⁷ Marure, *Ejem.*, p. 32. Nicaragua seceded, December 3, 1832; Guatemala, January 27, 1833; Salvador, February 13, 1833; Honduras, May 19, 1833; Costa Rica, September 18, 1833.

³⁸ *Cong. Globe*, 34 Cong. 3 Sess. App., p. 100.

Although at first he was not a formidable antagonist, he showed great determination and bitterness, so that gradually Carrera's power increased, as Morazan's declined. Taken up by the priesthood as the instrument for crushing Morazan, he circulated false stories about his enemies, wrought upon the superstitions of the people, and easily excited the fears of the Indians. The Liberals were practically defeated by 1838, and the Republic seemed to be a failure, although Morazan kept up the struggle for two years longer with the support of San Salvador, to which state the capital had been removed.

In the meantime, the republic rapidly disintegrated, and Congress passed an act, May 30, 1838, declaring the states free to constitute themselves as they might deem best, preserving, however, the popular representative form of government. Another act was passed, July 9, 1838, as follows:

The federated states of Central America are and by right should be sovereign, free, and independent political bodies.³⁹

The last Federal Congress closed its session July 20, 1838, and all subsequent efforts to bring it again to life proved unavailing.⁴⁰

Nicaragua had seceded from the Federation April 30, 1838, and the Honduran Declaration of Independence condensed into a single sentence was promulgated October 27, 1838.⁴¹ Another act was passed November 5, stating that Honduras was independent of the late Federal Government, of the governments of the other states of Central America, and of any other government or foreign power. The jefe of Guatemala April 17, 1839, declared the Federal Compact dissolved by the resumption by the state of its absolute sovereignty.⁴² Costa Rica was especially reluctant to accept the inevitable dissolution of the Central American Confederation. Its decree declared that:

³⁹ *Gual. Recop.*, Leyes, v. 1, p. 69.

⁴⁰ Marure, *Efem.*, pp. 44-45.

⁴¹ "El estado de Honduras es libre, soberano, e independiente."

⁴² Marure, *Efem.*; pp. 48, 50. Montufar, Resena, *Hist.*, v. 3, p. 282.

WHEREAS the de jure existence of the union could not be ignored until after all the States which had entered into it should expressly agree to dissolve it the resumption by Costa Rica of her full sovereignty was to be without effect if the Supreme general authority of the Central American Federal Republic was ever reestablished.⁴³

When Morazan's presidential term expired February 1, 1839, not even an outward tie remained to hold the several states together, but without delivering up his office, which had ceased to exist, he continued the struggle, although he was resisted by Nicaragua and Honduras, which had been united by a treaty of alliance since January 18, 1839. This treaty had been ratified for the purpose of maintaining the independence and sovereignty of the two states, and also to protect other states against all interference on the part of the late Federal Government. The treaty gave new courage to Carrera and his supporters, and sealed the ruin of Morazan, and the disruption of the Federal Union.⁴⁴

Morazan was obliged to retire to Peru in 1840 with a few chosen followers. The persistent liberal did not give up hope, but gathered a force about him and landed at La Union in Salvador two years later to carry out his plan for the reestablishment of the federal authority over all of Central America. Well supplied with arms and ammunitions, his corps of officers selected from among the most distinguished men of the federation, Morazan expected that all the patriotic would join his standard as he marched without delay to San Miguel. The memories of their past misfortunes, however, were too fresh in the minds of the people; federation they had come to associate with disaster, and they felt that Morazan was bringing the torch of desolation into the country with no hopes of success. When the people did not respond to his call, he was forced to re-embark with his partisans, as the troops under Malespin, sent from the capital to combat him, approached San Miguel.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Am. Consti.*, v. 1, p. 325.

⁴⁴ Montufar, Resena, *Hist.*, v. 3, pp. 241-243.

⁴⁵ *For. Rel.*, 1886, p. 64.

One more attempt was made a short time afterward. Morazan suddenly took possession of Costa Rica with remarkable audacity and immediately proceeded to carry out his idea of establishing his power in other sections. He commenced to recruit and organize an army which he expected to carry the flag of the union through Central America; but he failed either to consolidate his government in Costa Rica, or to arouse the enthusiasm of the people of that state. A struggle against four governments, united for the time in friendship and prepared for resistance, could not be successful. The army finally revolted and attacked Morazan, whose few faithful Salvadorean soldiers, though they fought heroically, could not prevail against a whole people. Morazan was taken prisoner and shot September 15, 1842.⁴⁶

The worst indictment that can be brought against the greatest champion of Central American Federation is the harsh and cruel treatment of the clergy. On July 10, 1829, the whole body of the regular clergy with the archbishop of Guatemala were arrested and sent to Arnoa, whence they were shipped to Havana. It must be said that he was just as harsh in his treatment of his temporal antagonists, and that the harshness of his acts must be considered in the light of the necessity for the peace of the Republic. Certainly the measures Morazan adopted for the prosperity and progress of the country were wise and statesmanlike; the introduction of the "Code Livingston" with trial by jury, the public schools on the Lancastrian system, the abolition of the convents, the establishment of religious freedom, the encouragement of agriculture, trade,⁴⁷ and industry all made for social, economic, and political betterment.

A Central American writer bears testimony to the beneficial results of the Federation.

⁴⁶ *For. Rel.*, 1886, p. 64. Scherzer, *Travels*, v. 1, p. 312. His death was attributed by some to treachery.

⁴⁷ John Quincy Adams in his message to Congress in 1828 calls attention to the continuance of the Civil War in the Central American States. He said it "has been unpropitious to the cultivation of our commercial relations with them." See *Messages and Papers of the Pres.*, v. 2, p. 411.

Even as it was, no one, whatever his prejudice, could fail to perceive the advance in the manners and customs, and the change in the spirit of the people of Central America during the ten years of freedom of the press, which the constitution secured.⁴⁸

Morazan became known among his sympathizers as the "Washington Honduran," and his career justifies the estimate many placed upon him.

Wise in counsel, a most humane and energetic military chieftain, his immortal fame is one of the proudest boasts of Central America, the historic field of his heroic and self-sacrificing achievements.⁴⁹

Morazan's failure should not detract from his personal greatness; it is to his honor that he kept the ideal of federation ever before him even during the dark days of defeat and disunion, and that he was almost entirely free from the personal ambition, which mars the character of most of the Central American patriots. When Morazan failed, probably no one could have succeeded in upholding the principles of Central American Federation for which he at last gave his life.

The failure of this first and most important effort for federation was essentially a political failure, and was due to the ignorance of self-government, the conflict of political principles, the defects of the constitution and "the deadly enmity of parties."

The struggle of political principles was early manifested in the conflict between centralization and federation.⁵⁰ The Captaincy-General of Guatemala had been divided into several Intendancies all under the rule of one Captaincy-General, and with independence acquired, they were not generally disposed to become sovereign States, but rather to form themselves into a single federation. The United States was an inspiring example of such a united country, but unfortunately for the success of the federation, the long interregnum between the achievement of independ-

⁴⁸ Quoted by Squier, *Nic.*, v. 2., p. 383.

⁴⁹ Lombard, *New Hond.*, p. 22. The book is sympathetic to a fault with everything Central American.

⁵⁰ Calderon, p. 222.

ence and the meeting of the constituent assembly had created local interests and ambitions adverse to the centralization of power. Salvador declared herself a federal state, and this movement forced the majority of the Congress to convert the five provinces of the former kingdom of Guatemala into five sovereign states bound together by a federal union, which contained the germs of future dissension. The continuance of the Central Government to which the country was accustomed might have saved the conflict of parties.⁵¹

The form of government adopted was no more acceptable to the conservative party, comprising the clergy and the Spanish bureaucracy, than a more centralized form would have been. From the very first there was a bitter conflict with the Federal element, made all the more serious by the anti-clerical attitude shown by the Liberals in legislation. The Federation could not long endure such a cleavage in public sentiment.⁵²

The defects also of the Constitution, adopted in 1824, are glaring.

The United States made themselves a great and strong nation under the shadow of the federal system, but when Central America tried to imitate the United States, "adopting the federal system, she obtained for result, wars, and disasters."⁵³ One explanation for the totally diverse results of the federal system is the difference between the Constitutions of the two federations.

The Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Central America established the Catholic Religion and excluded the public exercise of every other. The feature which had the most disastrous consequences was the failure to establish a federal district like the District of Columbia in the United States. The members of the government were looked upon as guests of the state capital; the jefe of the state considered them as rivals. This rivalry developed into a struggle between the President of the Re-

⁵¹ *For. Rel.*, 1886, p. 63.

⁵² Squier, *Nic.*, v. 2, p. 389 f.

⁵³ Montufar in *For. Rel.*, 1883, p. 44.

public and the jefe of the state. Barrundia, the jefe of Guatemala, was conquered in 1826 by President Arce, and in 1829 Arce was conquered by Barrundia's party.⁵⁴

The authors of the Central American Constitution did not know how to solve the problem of equality presupposed by the federal system. A parliamentary dictatorship was initiated by attributing all powers to Congress; the Central American Senate did not have the force to give equality to the States, and the President of the Republic was obliged to give effect to a decree of the Chamber of Deputies, even when the Senate denied its sanction.

In Central America, unconstitutional laws framed by the federal Congress could be opposed by the States only with armed resistance, the Supreme Court lacking the power to declare them null and void. Moreover, when we consider that the duties of many officials were not well-defined, it is not surprising that all was confusion until the catastrophe in 1829. Montufar intimates that under the impracticable Constitution of 1824, Switzerland and the United States would have become disorganized.⁵⁵

If the political failure could have been avoided by wise statesmanship, and an altruistic citizenship, it is exceedingly doubtful whether the Federation could have maintained itself under the discouraging economic conditions, especially lack of communication and the absence of a compact population.⁵⁶ The greater part of the territory was occupied by dense forests, which with the mountainous nature of much of the country, hindered inter-communication. With the suppression of Indian slavery,

⁵⁴ Montufar in *For. Rel.*, 1883, p. 45.

⁵⁵ Montufar in *For. Rel.*, 1883, p. 45.

⁵⁶ Mendieta, *La enfermedad de C. Am.*, p. 123. "It is indisputable that one of the most powerful causes of the disunion in 1839 was the difficulties of communication in the interior of Central America, not only between countries but to the interior of each country." Niederlein, *Costa Rica*, p. 127. "The weak unmanageable union underwent a slow disintegration. It fell to pieces for want of internal communication. *For. Rel.*, 1887, p. 105. "Lack of quick communication," said Logan, United States Minister, "constitutes the chief obstacle against a federal union of the Central American States."

work largely ceased on the roads and trails, many of which became almost impassable. The relations between the five Republics separated from each other by immense spaces, without inhabitants, became less regular, and the interior commerce, which had never been very active, practically ceased. This isolation of the provinces favored dangerous local ambitions and rivalries.⁵⁷

The failure of Federation was also due in part to the jealous rivalry between the States. In the lower chamber of the Federal Congress Guatemala had a majority; this superiority made her domineering, which in turn provoked the devastating Civil Wars. Salvador especially could not bring herself readily to accept the hegemony of Guatemala; the frequent wars in which the two states engaged were merely interstate struggles for supremacy.⁵⁸

How far clerical influence was responsible for the failure of Federation it is difficult to state. A wiser handling of the problem created by the clerical reactionaries might have allayed somewhat their enmity against the Liberals. At least a policy less harsh and cruel would not have aroused the general sympathies of the people against the regime of Morazan. Had the church been divorced from the state and ceased to be an ally of corrupt politicians, a tremendous obstacle to disunion would have been removed.

The failure of diplomacy in safeguarding the interests of the new Republic was deplorable. A suspicion was abroad that the English were intriguing with the Serviles in an endeavor to overthrow the established government;⁵⁹ but even if these intrigues were proved, they could not have had any decisive effect upon the destinies of the Central American republic of this period. More important is the assertion of a United States Minister, that the

dissolution of the first confederation might have been avoided if the United States had had at the time a properly qualified diplomatic agent in the country.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Belly, *A travers de C. Am.*, p. 70.

⁵⁸ Calderon, *Lat. Am.*, p. 223.

⁵⁹ Squier, *Nic.*, v. 2, p. 413. Bancroft, v. 8, p. 186, note.

⁶⁰ *For. Rel.*, 1871, Fish to Riotta, p. 683.

Whether we are willing to accept this statement at its face value or not, a first-class diplomat in Central America during the "Critical period" of Central American history, would have had tremendous influence in advising the young and struggling government of the Republic. The Central Americans made an honest attempt to follow our example, and although they succeeded in gaining independence, thanks to the supineness of Spain, they failed in their experiment at self-government. Since the United States was the inspiration of their endeavors and furnished them with their model, a real, vital, friendly spirit might have been expressed, and wise counsel gently forced upon them. There was no fear of the United States south of the Rio Grande during those years, and the help that could have been given would have been willingly received as from a good neighbor with no motive of self-interest.

CHAPTER III

EFFORTS AND FAILURES 1842-1864

When the Confederation dissolved the provincial history began. The course of events was confused, yet there was a practical identity of political movement in the various states. The multitude was swayed by anarchical tendencies, and the tyrants, necessary to control the situation, were not wanting. Energetic caudillos endeavored to enforce order in the interior, and to organize the national finances.

Among all the despotic leaders, no one was more powerful nor picturesque than Carrera, the destroyer of the Confederation, and the conqueror of Morazan. It was no ordinary man who advanced through anarchy and blood from his position as a pig-driver to the office of chief executive of the Republic of Guatemala. Rude, ignorant, unpolished, of gigantic strength, ferocious passions, indomitable will, and dauntless courage, Rafael Carrera was taken up by the priesthood as an instrument for crushing Morazan.⁶¹

⁶¹ *Cong. Globe*, 34 Cong. 3 Sess., app., p. 100.

In personal appearance this dark-colored and ill-looking mestizo was not prepossessing.

A man of medium height, with a clear predominance of Indian blood in his veins, which is indicated equally by the shade of his hair, the scantiness of his beard and the slight obliquity of his eyes, which he keeps habitually bent downwards.⁶²

He wore on great occasions an English general's coat, but "the tailor could not be expected to suit his strange misshapen figure, so that he resembled a scare-crow with a coat pinned on."⁶³

When Carrera first came to power he was cruel and blood-thirsty, but later, as he amassed a fortune in cash, lands, and houses, it became his interest to maintain a settled government and give protection to property. Once master of the situation, he conducted himself with remarkable moderation. Without political experience nor education, he knew instinctively how to retain the power he had won by his sword. The leading members of all parties, at one time or another, abased themselves before him. He joined with them all, and succeeded in profiting by their antagonisms. His rôle was a difficult one to play, however. He developed gradually a coolness toward the aristocrats and priests who had raised him to power, and in the later years of his regime chose none of his ministers from among them. Another difficulty was created when he allied himself with the whites and mestizos. The Indians said he had betrayed them, and his influence over them was gone. All the other classes never ceased to hate and fear him, and watch for an opportunity of overturning his power.

Though for a long time Carrera refused the presidency on account of his want of education and the incompatibility of his habits with the dignity of the position, he secured the office for life by Acts of 1854. He received power to name his successor, and his titles as printed in the official acts were:

His most excellent Senor, Don Rafael Carrera, President for life of the Republic, Captain-General of the Forces, General

⁶² Morelet, *French in C. Am.*, p. 410.

⁶³ Dunlop, R. G., *Travels in C. Am.*, p. 83.

Superintendent of the Treasury, Commander of the Royal order of Leopold of Belgium, Honorary President of the Institute of Africa, decorated with various insignia for actions in war.

Whatever may be the judgment of posterity upon this strange despot, at all events he succeeded in maintaining order and tranquillity, thereby promoting a certain material prosperity. Nevertheless, many will agree with Morelet,

Among all the misfortunes which had happened to Guatemala since the period of its independence, none have been more deplorable than that which befell it on the day when, after twenty-five years of intestine war, it forced its neck under the yoke of an Indian.⁶⁴

The "Angel of Guatemala" or "Demon," as one may chose to call him, ruled without interruption till his death early in April 1865, with his power consolidated, and its supremacy felt over the rest of Central America.⁶⁵

We are not concerned with the rule of Carrera during the thirty years of his despotic government. The brief sketch of his career seemed necessary for the proper understanding of the efforts to confederate the Central American States which fall within the period of his domination. The failure of the various attempts to unify the interests of the Republics, if no more evident cause appears, may be attributed to his antagonism and ambition.

The history of the period, 1842-1862, records eight efforts to federate the nations of Central America. The five Republics were not involved in each movement, and failure attended the partial realizations of the Central American ideal. The attempts however are significant of the idea of Confederation, which was pursued by all the tyrants who came into power, and was dominant, not only in the minds of the Statesmen, but also in the public opinion of the period.⁶⁶ Article I of the Constitution of Honduras represents the feeling common to Central America.

Honduras is a state separated from the Central American Confederation. In consequence, thereof, it recognized as its

⁶⁴ Morelet, *Travels in C. Am.*, pp. 409-411. Bates, *C. Am.*, p. 111.

⁶⁵ Bancroft, v. 8, p. 284.

⁶⁶ Alvarez, A., *Am. Prob. of Int'l Law.*, p. 20.

principal duty and its most pressing necessity to return to the union with the other States of the dissolved federation.

1. On March 17, 1842, a Central American convention was held at Chinandega in Nicaragua, with representatives from Nicaragua, Honduras, and Salvador. On April 11, a national government was organized. D. Antonio Jose Canas was elected by the same delegates, jefe of the new government. Guatemala and Costa Rica were invited to join the new union, but neither accepted the invitation. The union had but a nominal existence, and failed for various reasons.⁶⁷

2. This temporary union however was not without value. Two years later in 1844 the government of the three States succeeded in restoring peace between Guatemala and Salvador, which had been interrupted by the invasion of Guatemala by the President of Salvador, General Malespin.⁶⁸ A treaty of friendship and alliance was signed April 4, 1845, by the Salvadorean and Guatemalan representatives. Both countries agreed to appoint two delegates each, to meet at Sonsonate, Honduras, for the purpose of agreeing upon the establishment of a national Central American authority, "clothed with the duty of maintaining internal peace, and directing the foreign relations of the union."⁶⁹ These delegates were directed to invite Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua to join in the movement. On the appointed day, May 15, 1846, only the representatives from Salvador and Costa Rica appeared. The deputies of Guatemala did not arrive until the middle of July. By that time one of the Costa Rica representatives had died, whereupon the other refused to act alone. After a short time spent in desultory and inconclusive negotiations, the deputies separated without effecting any thing, and the plan was dropped.⁷⁰

3. The next step toward union was taken by the Diet which met at Nacaome, Honduras in 1847. Honduras,

⁶⁷ Montufar, v. 4, pp. 304-305. Bancroft, v. 8, p. 187.

⁶⁸ A. Gomez Carilla, *Hist. de la Am. Centrale*, p. 278.

⁶⁹ Scott, J. B., *Am. J. of Int'l Law*, January, 1908, p. 123.

⁷⁰ *M. and P. of the Pres.*, p. 36, 1853.

Salvador, and Nicaragua were invited to unite for the purpose of ensuring peace and independence. The Diet recommended that the three States be represented in a Constituent National Assembly, to be held at Tegucigalpa, Honduras, August 1, 1848. An agreement was signed for the establishment of a provisional national government. As before, Guatemala and Costa Rica were invited to become parties to the pact, which anticipated a permanent alliance between the signatory states.⁷¹ This attempt was no more successful than the preceding ones. Guatemala and Costa Rica declined all overtures to establish a new Confederation. No republic seemed altogether willing to enter into a federation unless it could be the dominant force. At least no leader was interested in a union which could not gratify his ambition to govern. The attitude of Costa Rica after the collapse of 1847 is hard to explain, for the feeling of loyalty to the Union was manifested in the Costa Rican Constitution of January 21, 1847, which declared that Costa Rica was

one of the political entities which had entered into the composition of the Central American nation, and that it would concur in the reorganization of that nation whenever the other Central American States should be ready to negotiate a new compact of social union.⁷²

The scheme for federation, according to the United States minister to Central America, was opposed by the members of the old aristocratic or monarchical faction. He was convinced that they were at the bottom of the revolutions in Nicaragua and Honduras, which were intended to prevent union. These aristocrats had the countenance and support of the British officials of the country,

who at this time both in Costa Rica and Guatemala, by publications and otherwise, not only denounced the whole plan of Federation and what they called "the American policy," but threatened to break it down whenever its organization should be attempted.⁷³

⁷¹ Scott, *Am. J. Int'l Law*, January, 1908, p. 123. Bancroft, v. 8, p. 208.

⁷² *Am. Constit.*, v. 1, p. 325.

⁷³ Squier, *Nic.* p. 559.

The population generally concurred in representing the unsettled state of affairs as in great measure due to foreign intervention and intrigue.

4. It seems probable that the efforts for Federation would have ended here for a time, had it not been for the acute situation between Nicaragua and Great Britain over the Mosquito Question, and the seizure of San Juan. The three central countries of Central America were moved to unite for mutual defence. On November 8, 1848, commissioners concluded a treaty at Leon, Nicaragua, by which it was stipulated that the "national representation of Central America," consisting of two plenipotentiaries from each state was to meet at Chinandega, Honduras, to elect a President and Vice President for the united countries. Costa Rica and Guatemala, according to custom, were invited to join.⁷⁴

Honduras had long been the center of Federal activity. That republic assumed the leadership and dictated the policy of this new union. February 28, 1850, a convention ratified the union. Instructions were sent to Mr. Hise, United States Minister, from the State Department at Washington, advising him,

should suitable occasion offer, to promote the reunion of the states which formed the Federation of Central America.⁷⁵

Honduras committed the blunder, often repeated in Central American history of trying to force the other States into Federation. A war was conducted against Guatemala; but even with the aid of Salvador and Nicaragua it was foredoomed to failure. What Morazan had failed to achieve in the days of the first Federation, could not be attained now after years of disunion. The war developed into a factional strife.

5. Vasconcelos, President of Salvador, considered himself to have sufficient power and prestige to reconstruct the Central American nation. In accord with Honduras, he raised the national standard and invaded Guatemala

⁷⁴ Squier, *Nic.*, v. 2, p. 135.

⁷⁵ S. Ex. Doc. 43; 31 Cong. 2 Sess., p. 77.

with an army of Salvadoreans and Hondureans; but Carrera waited for him at Arada and defeated him, February 2, 1851.⁷⁶ Salvador and Nicaragua soon wearied and left Honduras to go on alone. Carrera and the armies of Guatemala were triumphant and a barrier raised to progress over all Central America.⁷⁷

6. The next year, Cabanas, President of Honduras, considered himself called upon by destiny to reorganize the union. The "hero persecuted by ill-fortune," convoked a congress of representatives of Nicaragua and Salvador at Tegucigalpa for the purpose of meeting again as a "Dieta Nacional."⁷⁸ The incentive for this gathering was represented to be an alleged occupation of territory belonging to Honduras, by Great Britain. No notice was given to Guatemala and Costa Rica. The Diet met, October 9, 1852, and decreed the union of the three states under the title, "Republic of Central America." Cabanas was naturally President. Although he had raised troops to sustain the acts of the Diet, the other two governments hastened to disown the acts. Thereupon Cabanas threatened war upon Duenas, the President of Salvador, but strife was fortunately averted by diplomacy. Afterwards, Cabanas appeared in Guatemala and took possession of Chiquimula, but he could not maintain his position and was forced to retreat to Honduras. The troops of Guatemala followed him into his own territory and deprived him of his office.⁷⁹

The description of Cabanas makes his easy defeat seem all the more deplorable.

Cabanas was a smart little man of mild address and has about the best character of any who have mixed in the revolutions of Central America. Though often holding big commands, he has always remained poor and is one of the very few whose hands have never been stained by plunder.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ *For. Rel.*, 1886, p. 64.

⁷⁷ Stephens, *Incidents of Travel*, v. 2, p. 85.

⁷⁸ A. Gomez Carilla, p. 279.

⁷⁹ *For. Rel.*, 1886, p. 64.

⁸⁰ Dunlop, *Travels in C. Am.*, p. 60.

7. After the failure of Cabanas in 1852, no serious effort was made to bring the republics into closer relations for a decade. In 1862, Nicaragua took the initiative. Honduras and Salvador readily accepted the projected merger of all the states. Guatemala held aloof, notwithstanding the fact that the city of Guatemala had been selected as the Capital of the Union. A Nicaraguan commission even went so far as to offer the supreme command to Carrera,⁸¹ but all efforts failed to establish a federation.

8. The final effort to reestablish national union during the regime of Carrera was undertaken in 1863 by General Gerardo Barrios, President of Salvador. With Honduras for an ally he provoked the war that was to give him, as he thought, the dominion over the five republics.

The campaigns opened with the victory of Coatepoque over the army of Guatemala commanded by Carrera. This triumph intoxicated Barrios. He believed himself already the master of Central America. Jerez, an illustrious Nicaraguan and a staunch unionist, was sent with Salvadorean troops to take possession of Nicaragua. In good faith, he had offered himself in the service of Barrios, believing that the political ideal of union would be carried out. The refugees and malcontents of Nicaragua persuaded him that the government of Nicaragua was so unpopular, that it could offer no resistance. Allured by the hope that everyone would receive him with open arms, he invaded Nicaragua; but he was quickly routed, and his prestige destroyed. Moreover, this defeat caused an unfavorable change in the situation of Barrios. He was soon completely abandoned by fortune, and finally forced to flee from the country.⁸²

This incident shows the great obstacle to Federation during this period—Carrera—and the strength of the sentiment favoring Federation. Moreover, it gave occasion for a most interesting expression of opinion from President Lincoln. In 1862, he regarded the agitation in

⁸¹ Gomez Carillo, A., p. 281.

⁸² *For., Rel.*, 1886, p. 64.

behalf of Central American union with favor, not, however, wrote Seward,

because he is prepared to say that the measure is practicable or expedient, but simply because it indicates a conviction that there are some common evils existing in the several states of Central America which are constantly reproducing civil and international wars, and a will and a purpose on the part of American statesmen to correct them.

Whether the natural positions of these states, their respective material resources, their natural and artificial channels and highways, and the interests and sentiments, habits, aspirations, and sympathies of their various populations favor at the present time an intimate political and mutually defensive union, are questions upon which it would be presumptuous for foreign statesmen to pronounce.⁸³

The fulfillment of the hopes of those who had the interests of Central America at heart was impossible during the long period of Carrera's ascendancy. The agent of the evil forces of disunion in the overthrow of the first Federation, he became the master of the situation for more than twenty years. During this time his presence brooded like a curse over the destinies of the republics.

The blame may not be borne alone by Carrera. Even had Guatemala proved true to the traditions of the past and supported the unionist ideal, the aloofness of Costa Rica would have prevented the complete unification of Central America. Not once did the five States succeed in uniting after the disruption. How far foreign interference was responsible for the constant failure it is difficult to say, though undoubtedly it was an important obstacle.

Cabanas stands out alone after the fall of Morazan as the worthy champion of Federation. Although a good man and not without the necessary ambition, he was too weak to succeed, and Barrios was completely blinded by his selfish ambition.

Assistance from without was of paramount importance. But as we have seen, Great Britain was antagonistic to any union and created serious difficulties by interference, and the United States was lukewarm in its sympathy with the Central American ideal.

⁸³ *For. Rel.*, 1874, p. 146.

CHAPTER IV

WALKER'S FILIBUSTERING FAILURES, 1856-1860

We pass now to the consideration of an effort to federate the states, led by an outsider. The history is complicated, but the essential points stand out with sufficient clearness to enable an estimate to be made of the attempt which aroused the interest of the United States and Europe.

The decisive defeat of the movement at San Jacinto, Nicaragua, in 1856, is annually celebrated in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The invasion is a reality to the people after the lapse of half a century.⁸⁴

William Walker, the oldest son of a Scotch banker who emigrated to Tennessee in 1820, was born at Nashville in 1838. He studied and traveled for two years in Scotland, France, Germany, and Italy. Upon his return to America, he became physician, lawyer, and editor in turn, before he was twenty-five years of age.

His "destiny," as he called it, carried him first to the Mexican state of Sonora where he failed to establish himself as President of the "Republic of Sonora." Defeated, he was not disheartened, for he had proved himself to be a leader of men. Well-prepared, he entered upon the supreme effort of his life.

Civil war had broken out in Nicaragua in 1854. The President, D. Fruto Chamorro, had been forced to flee to Granada. The Revolutionists had organized a provisional government at Leon with D. Francisco Castellon as director.

Salvador and Guatemala vainly tried to avert the war by tendering their mediation. At first the revolutionary forces of Castellon were successful, with the aid of officers and soldiers from Honduras, in advancing their cause, until they possessed all the Republic except Granada.⁸⁵ The siege of this town was so prolonged that the unstable supporters of the Revolution lost heart and the party of Chamorro recovered Managua, Masaya, and Rivas.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Roche, *Nic.*, p. 4.

⁸⁵ Perez, *Mem. Hist. Rev. Nic.*, p. 57.

⁸⁶ Walker, W., *War in Nic.*, pp. 1, 2. *M. and P. of the Presidents*, v. 5, p. 372.

At about this time, Byron Cole, co-proprietor of the San Francisco *Commercial*, prepared the way for the coming of Walker to that "Mahomet's Paradise," as Nicaragua was anciently called. Cole received a colonizing grant by the terms of which three hundred Americans were to be introduced into Nicaragua, and were to be guaranteed forever the privilege of bearing arms. The grant was transferred to Walker at Sacramento early in February, 1855, and the expedition was made ready without any show of secrecy. The district attorney, if Walker is to be believed, declared no law would be violated: General Wool, Commanding the Pacific Division, said he would not interfere, and Colonel Fremont thought well of the enterprise. Mr. Joseph Palmer of the firm Palmer, Cook and Company, advanced \$1000 and Walker was also aided by two friends, Edmund Randolph, and A. P. Crittenden.⁸⁷

After overcoming various difficulties at the point of departure, and after a long voyage of five weeks due to a storm, the brig *Vesta*, with fifty-eight Americans on board arrived at Realijo, June 16, 1855. The fortunes of Castellan were more desperate than in December when the contract was made with Cole. Walker and his party met the director of the provisional government at Leon, and the director confessed that he seriously needed the help of the Americans. Walker insisted on the commissioning of his force as a separate corps, which became known as "La Falange Americana." On June 20, the American was commissioned as colonel in the Democratic Army, and most of the Phalanx became Nicaraguans by a simple declaration of intention to become citizens as provided by the Constitution of 1838.⁸⁸ Walker immediately made the Transit the theatre of his operations for two reasons: he would be independent of General Munoz, in command of the democratic forces, whom he distrusted, and would be in communication with available reinforcements from

⁸⁷ Walker, *War in Nic.*, p. 24-30. Wells, W. V., p. 425. Doubleday, p. 61. Scroggs, *The Filibusters*, etc., p. 85 f. *New York Times*, July 23, 1857.

⁸⁸ Scroggs, *Filibusters*, p. 108.

California. Engagements were fought at Rivas and Virgin Bay, and Granada was taken by assault.⁸⁹ Castellon and Chamorro both died, but the conflict was waged as bitterly by their partisans.

At the new election D. Patricio Rivas was elected President, Colonel Walker receiving the appointment of commander-in-chief. Estrada became the head of the Legitimist Government.

The Rivas army was put on a peace footing, which left the chief military defence of the government to the Americans. All parties looked to them for the maintenance of peace and order. Rivas was moderate and gave offices to both parties that the civil discord might be healed. The President relied on the increase of the American element in the government to extinguish party passions, and a decree authorized the general-in-chief to increase the Americans in the army.⁹⁰ A colonization decree was also issued in order to increase the American immigration to Nicaragua.

The key to the understanding of the rise and fall of Walker in Nicaragua is his relations to the Transit.⁹¹ Up to the period of the discovery of gold in California, Central America was little valued and superficially explored, but in 1851, a company was formed by Cornelius Vanderbilt, called the Accessory Transit Company, which obtained a charter from the government of Nicaragua for a transit route. The government was to receive annually a percentage of the net profits. In 1852, the route was opened and hundreds of travelers took advantage of it, as the distance was 500 miles shorter than the Panama Route, and all but 12 miles was by water. In one year 24,000 passengers travelled through Nicaragua between the Eastern Straits and California.⁹²

⁸⁹ Scroggs, *Filibusters*, p. 109. Walker, p. 51. Montufar, L., pp. 69-78. Wells, pp. 51-55.

⁹⁰ Walker, W., pp. 131, 133, 144.

⁹¹ Scroggs, *Filibusters and Financiers* gives a detailed and scholarly account.

⁹² Oliphant, *Run to Nic.*, p. 357. Scroggs, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, July, 1905, p. 792. Scherzer, *Travels*, p. 4.

When Walker, before leaving San Francisco, tried to ascertain the wishes of the Accessory Transit Company, concerning the introduction of Americans into Nicaragua, the agent of the Company stated that his principals had instructed him to have nothing to do with such enterprises as those Walker was supposed to contemplate. In July, 1855, the Company sent from New York to Castillo a body of armed men, organized for the alleged purpose of protecting their property on the isthmus. Within a few weeks, Walker claims, most of them were engaged for the service of the Legitimist Government.⁹³

The intrigue of Walker against the Transit Company resulted in an agreement with Charles Morgan, the New York manager, and Cornelius K. Garrison, the San Francisco manager of the Transit Company, who in return for help given to Walker, were to receive the property of the old company, and a charter for a new company. This was to be brought about by Walker using a government claim against the Accessory Transit Company as a basis for annulling its charter and confiscating its property. Walker first negotiated with the officers and the old company at New York, through P. H. French, who had been sent to the United States as the representative of the Rivas government. Cornelius Vanderbilt, Joseph T. White, and the other officers suspected nothing. They contracted to send "emigrants" to Nicaragua at \$20 a head, a lower rate than usual. The amount due the company was to be charged to the State and taken out from whatever sum the company might owe the Nicaraguan government. During the three months December, 1855—February, 1856, 1000 men were sent to Nicaragua, advertisements in the New York and New Orleans newspapers procuring the recruits.⁹⁴

February 18, 1856, the trap was sprung. Not a cent of the 20 per cent due the Nicaraguan government from the Transit Company's earnings had been paid, though these were large. The old grant was abrogated, after the Company had refused to give any explanation or to liquidate

⁹³ Scroggs, *Filibusters*, etc., p. 86, 7. Walker, W., pp. 144, 147.

⁹⁴ Scroggs, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, July, 1895, p. 796 f.

the debt, and its property was seized to secure payment of its obligations. February 19, the route was regranted to Morgan and Garrison, although Walker experienced much difficulty in getting the consent of Rivas to the new charter, owing to the haughty and overbearing character of the old company. The new charter was naturally different from the old. The old transit company aimed to be masters of the government; "the new charter made the owners of the grant servants of the state, and the agents of its policy."⁹⁵ The new company undertook to transport recruits for Walker's army from all parts of the United States. The publication of the new charter was delayed so as to give Morgan and Garrison time to get ready to run steamers. The number of Americans increased in spite of the cholera scourge which had broken out in Granada, until in March, 1856, there were 1200 in the republic.⁹⁶ The result of this transfer of the transit charter was disastrous for Walker, as the powerful and wealthy Vanderbilt became his enemy, and accomplished his downfall.

In the meantime, Henry L. Kinney of Philadelphia had organized an expedition in New York in 1854, ostensibly to establish a colony on the Mosquito Coast of Nicaragua, although his real object was to secure control of the governments of Central America. Kinney succeeded in getting to San Juan del Norte with some followers, after having been wrecked upon Turk's Island. Kinney suggested an offensive and defensive alliance with Walker, who curtly refused, saying,

Tell Mr. Kinney, or Colonel Kinney, or whatever he calls himself that if I find him on Nicaraguan soil, I will most assuredly hang him.

Many of his colonists, however, went up river and joined Walker.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Scroggs, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, July, 1895, p. 802. Walker, W., pp. 155, 157.

⁹⁶ Oliphant, *Patriots and Filibusters*, p. 202. Oliphant, *Run to Nic.*, pp. 361, 362. Scroggs, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, July, 1895, p. 802.

⁹⁷ Walker, W., pp. 147, 148. Curtis, *U. S. and For. Powers*, p. 187. Roche, p. 92. Scroggs, *Filibusters*, etc., p. 93 f.

The failure to receive recognition of the Rivas Government at Washington was a great surprise to Walker and a severe blow to his cause. November 8, 1855, Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. Wheeler, United States Minister to Nicaragua, not to recognize the *de facto* Rivas government in Nicaragua. As Mr. Wheeler had already recognized the government before receiving this instruction, he was directed to cease "at once" to have any communication with the assumed rulers of Nicaragua. December 19, 1855, Parker H. French transmitted to Mr. Marcy his credentials from President Rivas, accrediting him as minister plenipotentiary to the United States. The President did not deem it wise to receive anyone as minister from that Republic, on the ground that the condition of political affairs was not acquiesced in by the citizens of Nicaragua. The decision was repeated February 7, 1856. Some accounts represented "that the present political organization is satisfactory to the people," while others indicated that

it had no foundation in the hearts of the people, who would very generally shake off the power of Walker if possible for them to do so, and that terror is its sole foundation.⁹⁸

Mr. Wheeler's reports were highly favorable to the *de facto* government.

When the news of the refusal to recognize Colonel French reached Central America, the hesitating republics at once decided to assume a hostile attitude. The Costa Ricans took the lead against the authority of Walker.⁹⁹

May 14, 1856, a new minister, Don Augustine Vigil, presented his credentials at Washington, and was duly received as the envoy from the republic of Nicaragua.

The members of Congress from the south were favorably disposed to Walker and blamed President Pierce for not having recognized the government established in Nicaragua, while the southern newspapers represent Walker as betrayed by the government and abandoned to the resent-

⁹⁸ Moore, *Digest*, v. 1, p. 140-144.

⁹⁹ Oliphant, *Run to Nic.*, p. 360.

ment of England. It may be true that President Pierce recognized the government of Rivas as a "cheap concession to friends of the filibusters in the United States," for the President was seeking a renomination.¹⁰⁰ The recognition of the Rivas-Walker government, however, was withdrawn in a few months, and July 24, 1856 President Rivas accredited a new minister to the United States. Mr. Marcy replied that the troubled state of affairs in Nicaragua rendered it uncertain who possessed the civil authority in the state, if indeed there was any established authority entitled to be considered as a "real or de facto government." The President declined to receive a minister from Nicaragua.¹⁰¹

On January 12, 1856, a circular was addressed by the Nicaraguan government to the several republics, declaring the peaceful intentions of Nicaragua, and requesting the appointment of commissioners to discuss and arrange the terms of a union of the five states. The old Serviles, always against Federation, were zealously discussing union for the purpose of finding pretexts to interfere against the Americans of Nicaragua. The Hondurean commissioner gave the only response to the circular, stating that his government would no doubt reply favorably, but such an answer was never received.

February 4, commissioners were sent to Costa Rica, but President D. Rafael Mora at once ordered them out of the Republic;¹⁰² and March 1, 1856, formally declared war on the "filibusters." The war was declared against the Americans in Nicaragua, not against the republic of Nicaragua.

The war lasted for about a year. Walker soon found it necessary to withdraw to Granada as Rivas, Virgin Bay, and San Juan del Sur were successively occupied by President Mora. To add to his misfortunes, fever began to rage at Granada; and discipline became lax, as many officers succumbed to disease; but fortunately 200 recruits arrived

¹⁰⁰ Roche, p. 134. Nicaise, p. 44.

¹⁰¹ Moore, *Digest*, v. 1, p. 143.

¹⁰² Scroggs, *Filibusters*, etc., p. 179. Walker, W., p. 149-164.

April 21, by steamer, while the force of Costa Rica was steadily shrinking from desertion and cholera.¹⁰³

Rivas became jealous of Walker and entered into traitorous correspondence with the Costa Rican Government. The enemies of his country were assured of his coöperation in any designs that they might entertain against the Nicaraguan Army commanded by Walker.¹⁰⁴ The critical position in which Walker was placed convinced him that he must take the reins of government into his own hands. A new election resulted in an overwhelming victory and made him President.¹⁰⁵ Walker's statement of the situation is of interest.

The administration of Rivas was transitional. It sought to increase the American element without inquiring what place the new people were to occupy in the old society. Rivas and his cabinet felt that Nicaraguan society required reorganization, but did not know how to accomplish it, nor would they have adopted means even if pointed out to them. It was when state, and farm and labor demanded reorganization, another executive was not a matter of choice.¹⁰⁶

Walker admits that his seizure of the executive power may have been made too soon. The organization of the new government was communicated to the United States Minister. July 19, Mr. Wheeler was received by the President at the Government Houses in Granada. The Minister opened his address to the Executive with these words,

I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you that I am instructed to establish relations with this state.

This statement was perfectly true, but the Washington Government thought that Rivas would be in power and not Walker. Mr. Marcy, the Secretary of State, when he heard of the real situation was greatly vexed over the matter.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Scroggs, p. 190.

¹⁰⁴ Oliphant, *Patriots and Filibusters*, p. 203.

¹⁰⁵ Roche, p. 111. Votes cast 23,236: Walker, 15,835; Rivas, 867; Salazar 2037; Ferrer, 4,447. Scroggs, *Filibusters*, etc., p. 201.

¹⁰⁶ Walker, W., p. 251.

¹⁰⁷ Roche, p. 112. Walker, W., p. 231. Wells, p. 263, diplomatic correspondence. Scroggs, p. 213, 216.

The difficulties of Walker's position had increased during the summer. The conviction had been growing in the Republics of Central America that the presence of the Americans in Nicaragua threatened their independence; Salvador had so stated her fears May 9, in a communication to Rivas. The northern departments of Nicaragua were invaded in the fall by the armies of Guatemala, Honduras, and Salvador. A Central American Alliance was virtually in force against the filibusters.

At the same time the clouds were gathering around Walker in Central America, the trend of events outside indicated the bursting of the storm. Turning our attention once more to the *Transit*, we note that Mr. Marcy was silent on the subject after Mr. Wheeler had investigated the legality of the transfer of the charter. The eighth of April, while Mora was in Nicaragua, Thomas Lord, the President of the Vanderbilt Company, wrote to Hosea Birdsall, its agent, authorizing him "to ask for the assistance of the commander of any man-of-war of Her British Majesty's Navy in the port of San Juan."

"The object of the *Transit* Company," he wrote, "is to prevent accessions of filibusters to Walker's force, pending his hostilities with Costa Rica, and to effect this purpose, no pains must be spared, or effort left untried."¹⁰⁸

In April, 1856, the American Secretary of State, Marcy, was advised by the Costa Rican Government that it meditated the seizure of the river and lake steamers and the consequent destruction of the *Transit*. Marcy replied that such an act could not be viewed with indifference by the United States. When Walker saw the declaration of Marcy, he felt that Costa Rica would not attempt to interrupt the *Transit* and thus risk a rupture with the United States.

Nor is it probable that Costa Rica would have done so without the assurance that the act would not provoke actual hostilities with the American Republic.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Walker, W., p. 248.

¹⁰⁹ Walker, W., pp. 350, 351. Wells, p. 263 f, diplomatic correspondence.

By the middle of September, 1856, the British had stationed a fleet of eight vessels off San Juan del Norte, while no United States vessels were sent to watch their movements and ascertain their purpose. Walker felt that the British fleet had no other intention than to influence the result of the war in Central America,¹¹⁰ and concluded that Marcy was coöperating with the British Government in its Central American policy.

November 1, the President of Costa Rica published a decree, the second article of which declared,

The navigation of the river San Juan del Norte is prohibited to all kinds of vessels while hostilities against the invaders of Central American soil continues.

Every effort to reopen the Transit failed, although on December 2, Walker received reinforcements to the number of 80 men. He pays a tribute to the good quality of those arriving at this time, and believed that if the same active effort to secure recruits in the southern States had been made three months earlier, it would have established the Americans securely in Nicaragua.

Walker was soon forced to concentrate his forces at Rivas, and abandon Granada, which was burned to the ground. Over its ruins these words were put up on a lance "Aqui fue Granada." (Here lies Granada.) This "Act of Vandalism" was censured in Central America and elsewhere, but Walker justifies it as a military measure of retaliation since the population had given material assistance to the enemies of the Americans.¹¹¹

By December 20, 1856, the concentration of American forces at Rivas was completed. Printed proclamations were distributed through the suburbs, promising, in the name of Rafael Mora, protection and free passage to the United States to deserters. Letters were addressed to Americans signed by deserters elsewhere, urging officers and men to desert Walker. The filibuster was probably not far from the truth when he said that

¹¹⁰ Walker, W., p. 352, 353.

¹¹¹ Roche, p. 133. Walker, W., p. 340.

other than Central American heads were busy plotting the removal of the naturalized Nicaraguans from their adopted country.¹¹²

The efforts to weaken the American forces had a tremendous effect. Desertion became a fearful epidemic.

Early in February, a number of Rangers with a commissioned officer deserted and took the road to Costa Rica, carrying off their horses, saddles, and arms. The morning report of February 6, shows twenty desertions in twenty-four hours; that of February 8 shows six.¹¹³

Walker, besieged in Rivas with a depleted force, was unable to bring cattle and other supplies from a distance. Hope was almost gone when early in March letters were received from Morgan and Garrison by their agents at San Francisco, ordering the "Orezaba" to be dispatched two weeks in advance of her regular day. The recruits for Walker were thus left in the lurch, and the inference was that the Transit Contractors were about to forsake the cause of the Americans in Nicaragua.¹¹⁴

Captain Davis of the United States sloop-of-war *St. Mary's*, then in the harbor of San Juan del Sur, seeing that Walker's handful of men must be destroyed without aid, arranged terms of surrender. It was agreed that Walker and his officers should leave Rivas, retaining their side arms, and embark on board the *St. Mary's*. His soldiers and adherents were granted amnesty and the privilege of remaining in or leaving the country.¹¹⁵ The surrender took place May 1, 1857, and Walker was soon in the United States again, disheartened but not despairing.

Antonio I. de Irisarri wrote to Cass that Walker was defiant and made enterprises of filibustering the scandal of the age. Walker, however, wrote to Cass, September 29, 1857,

Permit me to assure you that I shall not so far forget my duty as an officer of Nicaragua as to violate the laws of the United States, while enjoying the rights of hospitality within its limits.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Walker, W., p. 382.

¹¹³ Scroggs, *Filibusters*, etc., p. 305. Walker, W., p. 384.

¹¹⁴ Scroggs, *Filibusters*, etc., p. 239. Walker, W., p. 398.

¹¹⁵ Doubleday, p. 193. Roche, pp. 146-8. Scroggs, *Filibusters*, etc., p. 297 f.

¹¹⁶ 35 Cong. 1 Sess., H. Ex. Doc. v. 7, No. 24, p. 6.

Nevertheless, Walker with 150 companions sailed from New Orleans to Point Arenas, Nicaragua, in November, 1857, on the *Fashion*. Here he was arrested by Commodore Paulding, December 8, 1857, charged with a violation of the neutrality laws of the United States; and was later handed over to the United States Marshall for the Southern District of New York.¹¹⁷

When the arrest of Walker became known in the South, the agitation was so great that the American government was on the point of disavowing it on the ground that Commodore Paulding as an energetic man, full of loyalty, had exceeded his instructions. At New Orleans meetings were held at which vehement orations denounced his conduct and expressed openly their sympathies with the filibusters. Other meetings were held at Mobile. The Legislative Assembly of Virginia put itself on record in favor of Walker. The discussions in Congress over the question whether the arrest was legal or illegal, whether Paulding was to be censured or applauded, were long drawn out. When Walker was at liberty, he became the object of most flattering manifestations at Washington. He was encouraged to claim an indemnity of \$150,000 and the free transport of a new expedition to Central America.¹¹⁸ Buchanan finally mustered up courage to break with the South. He made the incident the subject of a message to Congress, January 7, 1858, in which he said,

In capturing General Walker and his command after they had landed on the soil of Nicaragua, Commodore Paulding has in my opinion committed a grave error She alone (Nicaragua) would have any right to complain of the violation of her territory, and it is quite certain she will never exercise this right. It unquestionably does not lie in the mouth of her invaders to complain in her name that she has been rescued by Commodore Paulding from their assaults. In thus far disapproving of the conduct of Commodore Paulding, no inference must be drawn that I am less determined than I have ever been to execute the neutrality laws of the United States. Had Commodore Paulding intercepted the steamer *Fashion* with General Walker and command on board, at any period before they en-

¹¹⁷ 35 Cong. 1 Sess. S. Ex. Doc. 13, p. 24, 27. *Nicaise*, p. 85, 86.

¹¹⁸ *Nicaise*, p. 85, 86.

tered the port of San Juan de Nicaragua, and conducted them back to Mobile, this would have prevented them from carrying on the expedition, and have been not only a justifiable but a praiseworthy act.

Buchanan condemns outright the expeditions against Central America from the United States as preventing peaceful emigration, arousing dread and suspicion of the United States, leading to the loss of high character for the faithful observance of international obligations and duties, and inspiring distrust of great nations.¹¹⁹ The reading of the message in the Senate produced a violent agitation sustained by some of the orators of the Democratic party.

Walker's third expedition of 200 men, landed at Truxillo, Honduras. The funds in the custom house were seized, but before the filibusters could establish themselves, Walker was forced to give himself up to the commander of the British war vessel *Icarus*, who handed him over to the Honduras military authorities. He was shot September 12, 1860.¹²⁰ The "grey-eyed man of destiny" had failed, and Congressman Haskins says of his followers,

I saw the remnant of Walker's deluded followers, who were landed at the port of New York, in the park, and a more abject and pitiable sight I never beheld. These poor fellows were without shoes and stockings, without any clothing, indeed, other than their shirts and pantaloons, and covered with lice and with scurvy.¹²¹

Walker's supreme desire had been to establish a Federation of Central America. If his leading motive had been otherwise, the story of his failure would not have interested us.

Belief in "manifest destiny" was fairly general in those years. It was not limited to the leaders of the slave states, who wished to expand southward; but was held by the average American citizen, who felt that the United States should control the whole of the American continent.¹²²

¹¹⁹ *M. and P. of the Pres.*, v. 5, pp. 466-469.

¹²⁰ Doubleday, p. 216. Curtis, *U. S. and For. Powers*, p. 88.

¹²¹ 35 Cong., 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, p. 213.

¹²² Roche, *Nic.*, p. 289. Mr. Roche quotes Senator Vorhee's statement of manifest destiny.

Walker was not a heretic regarding the doctrine of "Manifest Destiny," nor was he personally lacking in the spirit of adventure. These popular motives, however, do not entirely account for his career in Central America.¹²³

There was a strong feeling at the time in favor of the annexation to the United States of the territory beyond its southern border. Many thought that Walker had that movement in mind, and the English seem to have feared it. It was their fear which stirred the British to oppose Walker, but the American government, when it encouraged Vanderbilt to effect his destruction, realized that Walker did not have the slightest intention of adding an additional state to the American Union.

Slavery was an important factor in the support of the filibustering expeditions of this period. Walker in a letter to Honorable C. J. Jenkins of Georgia admitted that though he did not go to Central America to establish slavery, that was the guiding star of his policy after he reached there.¹²⁴ Some even believed at first that the United States Government, under the influence of the slave-holders then dominant at Washington, was backing Walker; the latter apparently believed this himself, or at least felt it to be to his interests to disseminate the idea.¹²⁵

The matured ideal of the greatest of modern filibusters was a "slave-owning Central American Empire."¹²⁶ Walker thus represented southern ideas and interests in his policy to form a federal union of the Central American Republics and Mexico. When Doubleday suggested that the methods he was adopting for compelling a recognition of the rights won by the Americans in Nicaragua, were not likely to prevail against the declared hostility of the world, Walker replied,

¹²³ Oliphant, *Patriots*, p. 208.

¹²⁴ Speech by Blair, F. O., in Congress on the Acquisition of C. Am., January 14, 1858, p. 8. This speech is published in pamphlet form.

¹²⁵ Roche, *Nic.*, p. 4.

¹²⁶ Walker, J. W. C., *Ocean to Ocean*, p. 270. 37 Cong. 2 Sess. H. Ex. Doc., v. 1, p. 420, Seward writes to Dickinson expressing this idea of the aim of Walker, June 5, 1861.

I am not contending for the world's approval, but for the Empire of Central America.¹²⁷

At another time Walker told this same officer, that

the present popular movement was to obtain a temporary success in order to demonstrate to the hierarchical oligarchy their necessity for his aid, by which he would in the end wield the temporal power over Central America and Mexico in unison with the policy and influence of the Mother Church.

Highly ambitious as Walker was, it must be said that his aspirations were political and not mercenary, if Mr. Weller of California bears true testimony:

I have known him (Walker) for several years on the Pacific Coast as a quiet, unobtrusive, and intelligent gentleman of uncommon energy and decided character. His integrity and his honor were never impeached in any quarter. He neither coveted lands nor money, for no one has less of a sordid feeling than General Walker. He was actuated by a big and honorable ambition and a patriotic desire to aid in establishing free institutions in Nicaragua, and ultimately confederate in a peaceful manner the Central American States into one great republic.¹²⁸

Mr. Oliphant, who was in the company of a large party of filibusters, received the impression that they aimed to replace an inefficient government, which left the resources of a magnificent and fertile country undeveloped, by a government which they would themselves supply. They professed the noble aspiration of "regenerating a neglected state, giving prosperity to its inhabitants and a profitable market to the world."¹²⁹ They were engaged in the same kind of an undertaking which if carried on by a government is called colonizing.

The empire of Central America of which Walker dreamed was based on the subjugation of the race inhabiting the land. He confessed as much, when he wrote,

They are but drivellers, who speak of establishing fixed relations between the pure white American race, as it exists in the United States, and the mixed Hispano-Indian race as it exists in Mexico and Central America, without the employment of force. The history of the world presents no such Utopian vision as that

¹²⁷ Doubleday, p. 216.

¹²⁸ 34 Cong. 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, p. 1070.

¹²⁹ Oliphant, *Patriots*, p. 175.

of an inferior race yielding meekly and peacefully to the controlling influence of a superior people. Whenever barbarism and civilization, or two distinct forms of civilization meet face to face, the result must be war. Therefore, the struggle between the old and new elements in Nicaraguan society was not passing or accidental, but natural and inevitable. The war in Nicaragua was the first clear and distinct issue made between the races inhabiting the northern and the central portions of the continent.¹³⁰

The sources of strength upon which Walker relied for the realization of his ideal of a Central American empire were almost powerful enough to give him success.

The spirit of adventure seeking for new fields for expression was an asset of primary importance. It gave Walker the brave and reckless men who loved a fight even better than life. He depended upon a constant stream of recruits from California, and also from Mobile and New Orleans, where the public sentiment was strongly in favor of filibustering.¹³¹

The repeal of the prohibition against slavery enlisted the support of the slave states of the Union. The agitation through the press and public meetings as well as in the Halls of Congress was so great that the Government seemed to wink at infringements of the neutrality laws.

Walker was not without strong support in Nicaragua. General Pineda, brother of the former President of Nicaragua, regarded Walker as the legitimate President of Nicaragua.

Without any power of influencing the ballot, he was elected by a larger majority than any president ever received before and because the only classes who labor or produce had witnessed under his auspices the abolition of forced military service, and saw in his election for the first time in their generation, the prospect of not being coerced by ambitious factionists to fight through interminable revolutions for a cause in which they took no interest. No valid election could take place as long as a Costa Rican foreign force occupied any part of the territory of Nicaragua. Hence Walker is still President.¹³²

After the treaty of peace was signed between the factions of the Nicaraguan revolution, Walker had established

¹³⁰ Walker, W., p. 430.

¹³¹ 35 Cong. 1 Sess., S. Ex. Doc., No. 13, p. 13.

¹³² 35 Cong. 1 Sess., H. Ex. Doc., v. 7, No. 24, pp. 15, 16.

a newspaper in Granada, *El Nicaraguense*, printed half in English and half in Spanish. In it were published reports of commissioners sent into all parts of the country. It was a great force throughout the country in molding public opinion favorable to Walker.

His effort would have utterly failed in the beginning in spite of the favorable circumstances had it not been for the financial support of those who were to become the recipients of favors from the new government. The advance of \$20,000 by C. J. McDonald, a confidential agent, sent to Nicaragua by Garrison, was of immense service, as the governments of Leon and Granada were entirely without means.¹³³

Also important among Walker's sources of strength was his own fixed faith in his star of destiny; but this he largely lost, after the defeat of his troops under Schlessinger by the Costa Ricans. Indeed, he addressed a letter to Mr. Wheeler, senator from California, which was published in the American papers, in which he stated that he no longer had any hope except that of United States intervention.

I am not to live long enough to see the end of this war, but I feel that my compatriots will not leave the result uncertain. I know that the honor and interest of the country which I love to call mine, in spite of the foreign service to which I am devoting myself, are engaged in the present fight. The hour ought to be preserved intact and those interests ought to be safeguarded with jealousy.¹³⁴

The sources of strength in the career of Walker in Central America were counterbalanced by elements of weakness which brought about his downfall.

He misjudged conditions in the United States; the facts were misinterpreted to conform to his desires. For example, Walker does not seem to have reckoned with the financial stringency then existing throughout the country, which made it impossible to raise the funds needed for the contemplated expeditions. Another illustration is the

¹³³ Walker, W., p. 127. The day after peace was declared, Corral drew on Walker for \$500 to pay the daily expenses of the forces at Masaya and Managua.

¹³⁴ Belly, v. 1, p. 283, and note.

statement by Walker that the platform adopted by the Democratic Party at Cincinnati in 1856 was meant as an endorsement of his career, when it really was merely in support of the completion of the Canal. He wrote,

In September, 1856, in the canvass for president, one of the great parties of the United States had declared in convention assembled its sympathy and pledged its support to the efforts then being made to regenerate Central America. Promises and pledges which relied on slave states for success were made, and it should have looked with favor on a measure which tended to strengthen slavery in the Southern States.¹³⁵

Walker's misinterpretation of conditions in the United States was not of vital consequence but the results of his errors of judgment in Nicaragua were underlying causes of many of his disasters. The executions authorized by the General often after strong protest, were blunders of great magnitude. The reaction soon manifested itself against the Americans. In all Central America, opinion was "violently excited against the Yankee whose violence it was seen equalled his audacity."¹³⁶

Another blunder more inexcusable was the assumption of the reins of government, instead of continuing on his successful course of using power through the agency of others. He took precisely the step that would kindle the jealousy of the people of the isthmus.

It was also a serious error, Doubleday thought, for Walker to affiliate with the Church at a time when freedom of thought had made progress. No one can question the sincerity of the man, since he publicly acknowledged his conversion to the Roman Catholic Church before his tragic death; but his course had a bad effect upon his Protestant supporters.¹³⁷

His scheme for the reestablishment of slavery was especially harmful. Walker was perfectly frank about this startling reactionary movement. In his book published in

¹³⁵ Walker, W., p. 265. Cincinnati Convention, Hon. P. Soule drew up the resolution.

¹³⁶ Nicaise, p. 51.

¹³⁷ Doubleday, p. 166.

1860 he undertakes to justify his course; he declares this act to be "the Key" to the whole policy of his administration.¹³⁸ He admits that the real explanation of the decree favoring slavery was the desire "by some positive act" to bind his cause in Nicaragua, with some "strong and powerful interest in the United States."¹³⁹ Nicaragua became the champion of the Southern States of the Union in the irrepressible conflict between free and slave labor.

The intrepid exponent of slavery was surprised when the free-labor Democrats of the North raised scarcely a voice in defence of the Nicaraguan measure. Walker admits that of the public men at the South, Honorable A. H. Stephens was one of a very few who perceived the clear import of the Nicaraguan movement, as strengthening slavery in the South by extending it beyond the limits of the union.¹⁴⁰ Walker further confessed his mistake when he wrote,

It is true that the author of the slavery decree was not aware at the time it was published of the strong and universal feeling that exists in the Northern States against Southern society.¹⁴¹

Another cause for failure was the strength of the coalition formed against the Americans. All Central America refused to recognize the Nicaraguan government. Honduras, Guatemala, Salvador, and Costa Rica combined not to save Nicaragua, but to save themselves from being merged into a Federation. Conservative Spanish-America was alarmed by the threatened aspect of the political horizon. Mexico, Cuba, and Ecuador, besides Central America were threatened by invading expeditions.¹⁴² This general foreboding of ill favored the coalition, for distant Peru so far sympathized with those who would repel the invaders that she advanced a loan of \$150,000 to aid the campaign. Besides, the enemies of Walker, as we shall

¹³⁸ Walker, W., pp. 256, 259.

¹³⁹ Walker, W., p. 263.

¹⁴⁰ Walker, W., p. 276.

¹⁴¹ Walker, W., p. 265.

¹⁴² Roche, p. 92.

see, had valuable help from the United States without which, perhaps, they could never have driven the Americans out.

In the criticism of General Walker's military ability, there is a suggestion that another might have succeeded where he failed. Honorable G. W. Hawkins, of Florida clearly analyzed this lack of genius in the filibuster leader, in 1858. First, he commends him for uncommon personal courage, force of will, and firmness under difficulties. Unfortunately he "permitted himself to be overreached by a coup de main of the Costa Ricans, thereby losing command of the San Juan and the lakes."¹⁴³ Being deprived of these points he was unable to receive succor through those channels or make a successful retreat. It may be said in Walker's defence that he accomplished all that was possible in the midst of the many difficulties in which he was involved.

The blame must rest on the character of his army rather than his manner of handling it. The constant desertions affected the spirits of the defenders of Rivas. The trouble began with those of European birth, but spread to the Americans. Walker says,

It wrung bitter tears of agony from every true-hearted man who witnessed the shame and dishonor of his countrymen.¹⁴⁴

With an army where even the pickets and sentries would go off with the countersign for the night, even a Napoleon must have failed.

In estimating the causes of his failure, Walker lays great stress on the attitude of Great Britain and the United States. England took rather philosophically the success of the Americans in Nicaragua. She did not dream of invoking the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty at the very time when its terms were the object of diplomatic discussion between Great Britain and the United States. An English paper said,

¹⁴³ 35 Cong. 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, p. 461.

¹⁴⁴ Walker, W., p. 405.

Our power will only be engaged in the case, unfortunately too probable, that the army of Nicaragua should attack the Mosquito territory placed under the protection of England.¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless the interference of England greatly distressed Walker.

In a letter to Weller dated at Granada, April 15, 1856, Walker writes that the states of Central America were stimulated to antagonism against Nicaragua by agents of England and France, and that intercepted correspondence of the Consul General of Costa Rica in London showed positive evidence of the active sympathy of the British government manifested for those who opposed the Americans in Nicaragua.¹⁴⁶ The Consul General wrote to his President, Rafael Mora, that the British government would sell to Costa Rica 2000 army muskets, at a nominal price, for the purpose of "kicking Walker and his associates out of Nicaragua."¹⁴⁷ The interest of Great Britain centered in, not friendship for Costa Rica, nor hatred of the Americans, but \$17,000,000 invested by English capitalists in Costa Rican bonds. These bonds were afterward defaulted.¹⁴⁸

Thomas Manning, British Consul at Realejo, in 1849 foresaw the danger of Americans passing through Nicaragua in great numbers. He wrote to Palmerston that unless England averted the calamity, in ten years the country would be "overrun by North American adventurers."¹⁴⁹ England had the wisdom to make her merchants consuls and to entrust diplomatic business to them. Manning had houses at Leon and Chinandego. "The sting of self-interest kept the sentry from sleeping on his post."¹⁵⁰

Oliphant believed that the policy pursued by Great Britain in regard to the filibusters was a mistaken one. A great Central American empire would have been a counterpoise to the United States.

¹⁴⁵ Nicaise, pp. 47, 48.

¹⁴⁶ 34 Cong. 1 Sess., *Cong. Globe*, p. 1070.

¹⁴⁷ Roche, pp. 98, 99. Wells, p. 149 f. Br. State Papers, XLVI, pp. 784-785, 796, 803.

¹⁴⁸ Roche, p. 99.

¹⁴⁹ Walker, W., p. 171.

Politically, the success of General Walker to prevent which we coöperated with the United States would have been as great an advantage to Great Britain as it must have proved an annoyance to them.¹⁵¹

Walker was not surprised at the attitude of Great Britain, but the policy of the United States was inexplicable. At times it was favorable; President Pierce and his Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy, made known to Walker the motives for refusing to receive Mr. French and invited him to confide the function of minister to a more worthy man. Father Vigil was recognized by the Washington government, and the sympathies of Mr. Wheeler, the United States Minister in Nicaragua were fully with Walker. His successor, Major Hise, was one of Walker's friends, yet the United States finally failed him.¹⁵² Its refusal to recognize General French led the hesitating republics of Central America to decide for hostile intervention.

The United States government saw the danger from the formation of a federal union of the Central American republics and Mexico.¹⁵³ Pim says,

The formation of a powerful independent Central American Federation was not palatable to the Cabinet at Washington, for the principal reason, that the monopoly of the Isthmus would no longer be in the hands of Americans, but be open to the world.¹⁵⁴

A more simple explanation of the vacillating attitude of the United States is found in the political situation. President Pierce was swayed by the spirit of indecision that possessed him in view of the coming party convention and the necessity to win votes.¹⁵⁵ While Weller fought at Rivas Buchanan succeeded to the presidency, and found it necessary to impress upon the Cabinet a more decisive policy toward Central America. The British government demanded of the United States government that enlistments for service against the peace of a neigh-

¹⁵⁰ Walker, W., p. 171.

¹⁵¹ Oliphant, *Patriots*, etc., p. 209.

¹⁵² Nicaise, pp. 49, 50.

¹⁵³ Oliphant, *Run to Nic.*, p. 368.

¹⁵⁴ Pim, *Gateway of the Pacific*, p. 47.

¹⁵⁵ Roche, p. 134.

boring state should be stopped; and the British government had made peace with Russia. The Anti-Slavery Party in the northern states spoke vehemently against the Administration for countenancing the proceedings of a "usurping slaveocracy."¹⁵⁶ Mr. Buchanan dared not refuse in the face of the menacing attitude at home and abroad, to instruct American naval officials to capture armed emigrants, and harbor officials to refuse clearance papers to vessels carrying them.¹⁵⁷ The result was disastrous for the American cause in Nicaragua, which was thus cut off from reinforcements.

All of these causes we have considered pale into insignificance compared with the one great cause, Cornelius Vanderbilt. When the filibuster aroused the enmity of Vanderbilt, he committed a mistake which could not be corrected, for the financier was a great power not only in the world of finance, but also in politics. It was his influence that turned the scales of governmental indecision against the Americans in Nicaragua. It was his power that effected the withdrawal of northern capital for the help of Walker. It was his money that furnished cargoes of muskets and ammunition to the Central Americans opposed to Walker. It was his determined activity that caused the timidity and weakness of Morgan and Garrison resulting in the cessation of steamer traffic. It was his agent, Captain Spencer, who led the Costa Ricans to success in closing the Transit. Oliphant well knew the real truth of the failure, when he wrote,

Had it not been for the assistance rendered to Walker's enemies by Americans, he would never have been expelled from Nicaragua.¹⁵⁸

The practical outcome of Walker's attempt to found a Central American Empire, is the exhibition of the spirit of brotherhood, which united the five Republics before a common enemy to save the sovereignty and integrity

¹⁵⁶ Doubleday, p. 173.

¹⁵⁷ Doubleday, p. 174.

¹⁵⁸ Oliphant, *Patriots* p. 208.

of the territory of Central America. That patriotic spirit survived the passing of those who took part in the drama. A threat from without accomplished a union for practical ends where efforts from within had utterly failed. A monument was erected in 1895 in the National Park of San Jose de Costa Rica to the glory of the "Campana of 1856-7." On this sole national monument in Central America appear the Republics Costa Rica, Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, sculptured in bronze under the form of beautiful women, with their respective coats of arms, one of them, Costa Rica, bearing the standard of the Patria. In front of them is the defenceless body of the sister (Nicaragua) and a filibuster (William Walker) in flight before the furious attack of the defenders of the victim.¹⁵⁹

Our estimate of William Walker will depend upon our prejudices. An officer in his service struck a chord which has aroused an increasing response:

Blood has been shed to establish every government now known, and Walker, and Kinney are no more deserving of opprobrious epithets than the ancestors of every prince and potentate of Europe. There can be no justice in saying that every man who strives to win a share of territory that benefits nobody in a territory whose scattered occupants are of an effete and hybrid race, unable or unwilling to turn it to good account, should be considered a thief or an outlaw.¹⁶⁰

We know this officer to be a biassed partisan when he writes,

The conduct of General Walker has always been characterized by the most scrupulous, and delicate forbearance. He is honor itself personified in the most chivalrous manner and with the most honorable motives.¹⁶¹

The one dominant pursuit of Walker's career was the attainment of absolute political power. He failed and bears the stigmas placed upon him by his enemies. Deserters from Nicaragua did their utmost to blacken his

¹⁵⁹ *Centro-Am. Enero*, 1909, p. 30.

¹⁶⁰ An officer in the service of Walker, *Destiny of Nic.*, p. 14.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

memory when the fickle multitude had forgotten that they had welcomed him in the United States like a conqueror, and hailed him as a hero and martyr.¹⁶²

All students of Central American history must agree with Roche, who wrote,

Walker was the last and greatest of the filibusters; not a great nor a good man, but the greatest and best of his class. His fault was ambition, a fault because he was a failure.¹⁶³

Had he succeeded in establishing a federation of Central America and Mexico, those countries today would perhaps have been prosperous and progressive. The introduction of slavery would have proved to be a temporary advantage, and eventually ceased, as it has in other parts of the Western Hemisphere and the world. The history of Central America and Mexico since the failure of Walker is not in any sense the result of his defeat. It is a continuance of the history preceding his appearance. With the friendship of the United States and the support of American capitalists, the Federation of Central America would have been an improvement over present conditions; the turmoil and strife together with the annoying complications, would have been made impossible by the absence of disunion and division.

CHAPTER V

THE ATTEMPT AND FAILURE OF BARRIOS, 1872-1885

Several years passed without the tranquility of the states being disturbed by any serious menace of union. For a time the experience of past misfortunes served as a check to restrain ambitious leaders from imitating new adventures. Was the vision of Federation lost from the political horizon of Central America? As late as 1874 a United States minister reported,

If there are really political parties in Central America, neither one of them has embodied in its platform the enunciation of the

¹⁶² Roche, pp. 158, 159.

¹⁶³ Roche, p. 159.

principle that a federal union of the states is either practicable or desirable. If that principle ever was a cardinal one of the liberal party, it has become obsolete, and in my judgment now has quite as many advocates among those who are called serviles or re-actionists as among those termed liberals.¹⁶⁴

The same minister had reported the preceding year in a different vein, after he had discussed the subject of union "in an unofficial way many times in Costa Rica and Guatemala." He discovered that the "universally professed sentiment was in favor of union, except among the office holders." Union was regarded as desirable but impracticable owing to local jealousies, differences of indebtedness and difficulties of intercommunication. The office holders controlled the people so there could be no movement toward union.¹⁶⁵ This view was correct; the ideal of Federation was not lost from the political thought of Central America; it has grown dim, but was to shine as brightly as ever as new leaders, inspired with ambition, arose, who believed themselves to be superior to those who had gone before.

Justo Ruffino Barrios attempted to attain the ideal so constantly set forth in the messages of the Central American Presidents,—the merging of the Central American states into a republic. The method of diplomacy proved a failure, and the appeal to arms was no more successful. A complete understanding of the defeat demands a consideration of his rise to power.

Vicente Cerna, a religious fanatic, became president of Guatemala in 1865. His abilities, which appear to have been moderate, were devoted to the support of the clerical party. His rule was marked by a series of insurrections, and he was unable to keep the Indians and malcontents under control. The most serious revolt developed into a guerrilla warfare on Government monopoly. Senapio Cruz was the chief leader, although he was ably supported by Miguel Garcia Granados, and J. Ruffino Barrios. In 1869 the rebel army was routed as it approached the cap-

¹⁶⁴ *For. Rel.*, 1874, Williamson to Fish, June 24, 1874.

¹⁶⁵ *For. Rel.*, 1874, Williamson to Fish, p. 97.

ital, and a few days after photographs of the head of Cruz were sold in the streets. Later in the year, Granados aided General Barrios, invaded Guatemala and forced Cerna to flee. On June 30, 1870, Granados was elected President; but General Barrios was the real power behind the President. Several reforms were instituted, including the freedom of the press, abolition of the "aguardiente" monopoly, and the banishment of the religious orders.¹⁶⁶

In 1872, Barrios became President in fact as in name. He speedily attracted the attention of all Central America by his energy, ability, and courage. The insurrections which broke out repeatedly against his government he succeeded in crushing. Honduras and Salvador, headed by reactionary rulers opposed to his liberal and progressive work, could not prevail against him. He outlived the various attempts to assassinate him, and gave himself with tireless energy to the cause of reform and a good government. Barrios was strong enough to become as absolute a ruler as Carrera had been, though with this important difference—he used his power for good government, while Carrera was the enemy of progress.¹⁶⁷

Confirmed as Dictator of Guatemala, Barrios gave his attention to the question of Federal unity. The time was propitious for the undertaking. The complete triumph of the liberal cause had filled the hearts of all thinking people with a full sense of their deplorable situation. An ardent desire for the establishment of some sort of union among the five republics possessed the people.¹⁶⁸ A writer at Panama, on March 5, 1872, says,

Not only in Guatemala but in all Central America, there is a tendency to lay aside the things of the past and begin another life.¹⁶⁹

Barrios was not the first move in the project of union. President Medina on the part of Honduras proposed to

¹⁶⁶ Domville-Fife, *Guate.*, p. 57.

¹⁶⁷ Sears, p. 497.

¹⁶⁸ *For. Rel.*, 1871 p. 681, Riotto to Fish, August 6, 1871.

¹⁶⁹ *Annual Cycl.*, 1872, p. 372.

send envoys to the city of Salvador and confer upon that matter in January, 1871. Uriate, his minister, suggested that the conference be presided over by one of the United States ministers in Central America to avoid jealousy. There was no agreement as to the method by which the union should be established, nor, as to the form of the union itself. The *Honduras Press* advocated a perfect and full union between that state and Salvador as "a point of crystallization" for the other three republics. Mr. Uriate in a pamphlet stated his conviction that a federation had proved altogether out of the question, since the first Federation had failed. He proposed,

1. A vague "true and unalterable fraternity between the five Republics" together with a more tangible form of a defensive and offensive alliance against foreign aggression.
2. A formal pact in no case and under no pretext whatever to wage war against each other, with regulations providing for the settlement of all differences between one or more of the republics.
3. As a consequence of this fact, the establishment of a Central American Congress or Diet with power to act as arbitrator.
4. A pledge by all governments to respect the decision of the Diet and enforce them by all their power.
5. Free trade between the republics, unification of military grades, coins, weights and measures, and extradition of criminals.

Uriate proposed to united Honduras and Salvador into one republic with a "constitution framed on the basis of true Americanism." As soon as the new central government should be organized, all public power in both states was to disappear absolutely. The capital was to be at La Union or Amapala.¹⁷⁰ Nothing came of this proposal although it had many points of excellence.

In the year 1872, a report by the Minister of Foreign Relations to the legislature of Salvador shows the continued and earnest efforts of Salvador for reconfederation.¹⁷¹ No action seems to have been taken at that time; although the question was made so prominent that the United States

¹⁷⁰ *For. Rel.*, 1871, p. 681, Riotto to Fish, Aug. 6, 1871.

¹⁷¹ *For. Rel.*, 1872, p. 514.

diplomats became more thoroughly interested than ever before. The British policy had now so far changed that for the first time the representatives of the United Kingdom favored a federation.

Williamson and Corbett, ministers representing the United States, and the British Minister to Central America, proposed a meeting of the five Presidents of Central America for treating of general affairs and fixing the basis of a solid and lasting peace between the Central American republics, "until the epoch shall arrive, marked in the destinies of these people by a complete union of all in one single nationality."¹⁷² The private circumstances of some of the states made necessary an indefinite postponement of the meeting. The diplomatic efforts of the foreigners was as fruitless as the efforts as Central American diplomacy.

Four of the states (Nicaragua not included) united in a Conference at La Union, Salvador, February 17, 1872, "to establish the bases of a union of the Central American states;" to protect in an effectual manner the interests of Central America, and of each one of the contracting parties, preserve and maintain peace between them, and within each of the republics, as the best means of insuring prosperity at home and respect abroad; and to extend and sustain Republican principles, guarantee the autonomy of Central America, and the integrity of its territory from the aggressions and pretensions of all foreign powers; and to defend the sovereignty of each one of the states, and finally to promote every branch of progress, moral, intellectual, and material.¹⁷³

The pact was signed without the attendance of a Nicaraguan representative, but it was urged that Nicaragua "should not be deprived of the benefits accruing from the Union and separated from the 'Central American family.'"¹⁷⁴

Mr. Williamson wrote of this pact and those which had

¹⁷² *For. Rel.*, 1874, p. 173, Report of Sec'y of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica.

¹⁷³ *Annual Cycl.*, 1872, p. 88.

¹⁷⁴ *Annual Cycl.*, 1872, p. 594.

preceded it as "indications that the idea of unity has had, and probably may now have advocates." Writing of the general question of union, he says,

The frequent mention of the ultimate union of the States in the papers of public men might induce a stranger to suppose there exists some popular sentiment in its favor. Such expressions are used, I suppose, to round periods, pretty much after the fashion with which similar phrases are adopted in reference to the Utopian idea of a unity of the so-called Latin republics of America."¹⁷⁵

A careful study of Mr. Williamson's effusions on Central American unity fails to reveal any adequate knowledge of the general consensus of Central American opinion on the subject of federation. More important as a sign of the time is the following account of the celebration of National Independence at Amapala, September 15, 1872:

The consuls and the vessels in the bay hoisted their flags, and the cura said mass in a chapel adorned with palm leaves. Various patriotic speeches were delivered all ending with cries of "Viva la America Centrale."¹⁷⁶

On August 26, 1873, a treaty was signed by Guatemala, Salvador, and Nicaragua. This pact was virtually a defensive alliance against Costa Rica. Of importance for our discussion of the status of the question of union when Barrios made his ill-fated attempt, is the fifth act:

The governments agree that when the circumstances which cause this alliance no longer exist, they will earnestly labor for the formation of a common government for the Republics of Central America and will do all in their power to strengthen the bonds which unite the people of Central America.

The adhesion of Honduras was solicited. It was also agreed to propose its adoption to the republic of Costa Rica "whenever the circumstances of her government may appear favorable and promise to be permanent."¹⁷⁷ At a banquet in San Salvador, October 20, 1873, the Quadruplicate Treaty between the states of Salvador, Guate-

¹⁷⁵ *For. Rel.*, 1873, p. 173, Williamson to Fish, June 24, 1874.

¹⁷⁶ *Annual Cycl.*, 1872, p. 382.

¹⁷⁷ *For. Rel.*, 1874, p. 112.

mala, Honduras, and Nicaragua was ratified by Salvador. The President of Salvador said,

It is a step in the direction of the happy and glorious union that exists in the United States, and for which Salvador has always been ready to make any sacrifices.¹⁷⁸

The idea of unification of the five states was boldly put forward in all the speeches. So great was the interest at this time that the United States Minister was instructed to encourage the union. Mr. Williamson wrote, November 2, 1873, of "a strong and growing disposition to adopt the principle of confederation by four states. Costa Rica stands aloof because her people are opposed to federation with other states."¹⁷⁹

Barrios wished to avail himself of the renewed desire for union manifest throughout nearly the whole of Central America, in order to satisfy his ambition to rule a united government. He proposed that Guatemala should annex the other four republics. A congress of the five states was called in 1876 to prepare if possible and reestablish the union. The Congress actually met on February 22, 1876, but the plenipotentiaries "retired to their respective homes leaving the prospects of reconstruction as meagre as at the time of their assembling."¹⁸⁰

The spirit of union still existed in the hearts of the people. The most earnest manifestation was in Guatemala, September 15, 1876, at the anniversary of Central American independence. Though celebrated in all the states with unabated patriotism and in the midst of enthusiastic rejoicing, the oration of T. Martin Barrundia of the War Department, in the National Palace of Guatemala, was most significant as reflecting the prevailing opinion in Guatemala. He concluded his oration with the words,

It is on this day that we ought all to strive to join in the prayer that these five sections of the same territory may soon form one family, united under one and the same flag, and so present to the

¹⁷⁸ *For. Rel.*, 1874, p. 110.

¹⁷⁹ *For. Rel.*, 1874, pp. 110, 111.

¹⁸⁰ *Annual Cycl.*, 1876, p. 89.

world the grand spectacle of another Republic founded by them like that of Washington or William Tell.¹⁸¹

At the same time that the Congress met, Guatemala prepared for war with Salvador. The military organization of Salvador was poor, but Barrios met with more resistance than he expected when he invaded the state. He nevertheless acquired such advantages that he was able to establish as President of Salvador, Senor Zaldivar, who guaranteed to surrender Salvador to Barrios whenever he should undertake to create his national union.¹⁸² Indeed, not only did Zaldivar, in the name and as the representative of Salvador, promise to work for union, but so did General Maximo Jerez, representing Nicaragua, and Doctor Caleo Arios, representing Honduras. The latter was disgusted that Zaldivar was admitted to the Convention, and wrote to General Barrios telling him he committed an error in letting him in. Arios called attention to the fact that he had belonged to the school of Carrera and predicted that he would not fulfill his promises. The private pact, however, was agreed to.¹⁸³

At the "official opening" of the Guatemala Central Railroad on June 18, 1880, three Central American Presidents met in the same country and slept under the same roof—President Barrios of Guatemala, Soto of Costa Rica, and Zaldivar of Salvador.

In 1881, Honduras adopted a new constitution. That there might be no misunderstanding as a result of this political act, in Article I of the Constitution it is stated that,

Honduras is to be considered as a section disintegrated from the republic of Central America. In consequence, it recognizes as its principal duty and most urgent necessity, a return to a union with the other sections of the dissolved Republic. The present Constitution shall not stand in the way of the accomplishment of this prime object, but it may be amended or abolished by Congress in order to ratify the pacts, treaties, and conventions

¹⁸¹ *Annual Cycl.*, 1876, p. 89.

¹⁸² *For. Rel.*, 1886, p. 65.

¹⁸³ Leon, p. 59-61.

which may result in the national reconstruction of Central America.¹⁸⁴

On December 29, 1882, Barrios resigned the presidency of Guatemala, but the Assembly voted not to accept the resignation, as Barrios presumably expected. The hour had now struck for the diplomatic effort to realize union. A member of the Barrios Cabinet was sent on a mission to the other states to induce the governments to enter into a compact for the promotion of the scheme. There was no secrecy about this mission as it was publicly discussed. The Presidents of Honduras and Salvador, as we have seen, were already pledged to its support; there was doubt in regard to Nicaragua and Costa Rica.¹⁸⁵

In November, 1882, President Zaldivar had visited General Barrios. It was popularly supposed that this visit had reference to the union project, though there were reports even then that it found no favor with the people of Salvador. Unmistakable proofs were given Zaldivar on his return that the rumor was founded on fact.¹⁸⁶ Zaldivar, however, did not waver in his allegiance to the pact with Barrios.

Later, Zaldivar assisted at a military review at the camps of Jocotenango, held in honor of General Bogran, President of Honduras. At a banquet the same day in the Salon of the Conservatory of Music, opportunity was given for Zaldivar to say,

General Barrios has reached the moment of trial. We are here in order to fulfill faithfully the pledged word, and have agreed after the principle of my government. The more depends on us. I hope that in all we proceed unanimously, and that I be addressed and treated with frankness as usual, that whatever may be future events, for my part, I will demonstrate that I am and have been his best friend, and that we have the same fate.

This toast was greeted with applause. The words of the celebrated toast were repeated in a telegram of March 8,

¹⁸⁴ *For. Rel.*, 1881, p. 97.

¹⁸⁵ *For. Rel.*, 1883, p. 33.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 33, Hall to Frelinghausen.

1885, directed to General Barrios, and were published in the periodical, *La Union Nacional*.¹⁸⁷

The Guatemala commissioner arrived at the capital of Salvador, January 10, 1883, when he was joined by Mr. Gallegos, Salvadorean Minister of Foreign Affairs. They went together to Honduras, where they were received assurance of concerted action on the part of the President, government, and influential citizens. From Honduras they went to Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Judging from the tenor of the notices of their official receptions, addresses and correspondence published at the time, the union of the states was considered almost an accomplished fact.¹⁸⁸ But popular sentiment seemed to be decidedly hostile to the movement except in Guatemala. In Salvador popular demonstrations continued to express the public disapproval.¹⁸⁹

The enemies of Barrios insisted that absorption and conquest were his ambition. General Barrios was obliged in February, 1883, to direct a circular letter to his friends of the Liberal Party of the other republics. In it he clearly defined his line of conduct, and frankly declared his object. The reconstruction of Central America he, explained, was always in his thought; he had tried to spread the idea of union by means of the press, in order to enlighten and prepare public opinion, and at the same time ascertain whether it was possible to accomplish the task which he had undertaken in agreement with the President of Salvador, who in repeated conversations when he had been in Guatemala, had warmly seconded his initiative. He did not cherish the illegitimate ambition which had been maliciously attributed to him. On the contrary, he declared that he would not be coaxed to accept the Presidency of Central America, that he worked for the union precisely on the condition that he would not take over the government, and that he only offered his services in so far as necessary. He felt that his frank declaration ought to

¹⁸⁷ Leon, p. 64.

¹⁸⁸ *For. Rel.*, 1883, p. 33, Hall to Frelinghausen, March 27, 1883.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p. 34.

be taken as the true expression of his sentiments. He did not wish his personality to be used as a pretext to combat the idea of union.¹⁹⁰

The result of the visit of the commissioners of Guatemala and Salvador to the other states was an agreement on the part of all the states to send delegates to a convention to be held in Salvador in March, 1883. The convention, however, was not held at the time appointed. Costa Rica flatly declined to send delegates, feeling that the movement was ahead of public sentiment. When the Nicaraguan minister was informed of this refusal, he stated that a meeting of the delegates of four states with the object of forming a union of five could have no practical result.¹⁹¹

The diplomatic failure of General Barrios was due to the popular repugnance for Barrios outside of Guatemala.¹⁹² It seemed to the United States minister that the movement never had any real support outside of Guatemala, although ostensibly favored by the governments of Salvador and Honduras, and commended by President Zavala of Nicaragua in his last message. "In all the states except Guatemala, the popular opposition has been demonstrative and apparently nearly unanimous."¹⁹³ However, the effort did not end with the failure of diplomacy.

On December 4, 1883, a new Constitution of Salvador was adopted. It stated that Salvador was ready to join a Central American federation whenever circumstances permitted.¹⁹⁴

In February, 1885, Licendiado Sal. Barrutia was sent to Honduras and Salvador, where he conferred with the Presidents of those republics regarding the attitude of Nicaragua toward the projected union, and prepared the

¹⁹⁰ Leon, p. 66.

¹⁹¹ *For. Rel.*, 1883, p. 54.

¹⁹² *For. Rel.*, 1885.

¹⁹³ *For. Rel.*, 1885, Hall to Frelinghausen, April 14, 1883.

¹⁹⁴ *For. Rel.*, 1884, p. 34. Art. 2. Salvador considers herself a separate section of the Central American nation, and is disposed to concur with all or any of the republics into which it is divided in the organization of a national government whenever circumstances may permit, or it may suit her interest, as also to form a part of the great Latin-American Confederation.

way for the issuance of the decree which Barrios had determined should unify Central America.¹⁹⁵

On the evening of February 28, 1885, at the National Theatre in Guatemala City, a uniformed officer appeared on the stage and read the proclamation of President Barrios, who declared himself Dictator and Supreme Commander of all Central America, and called upon the citizens of the five republics to acknowledge his authority and take the oath of allegiance.¹⁹⁶ The coup d'état took the populace by surprise, though everyone knew Barrios aspired to restore the Union. It was not long before the shouts of the people, thronging the streets, rent the air, "Long live Dictator Barrios!" "Vive la Union!"¹⁹⁷ The next morning the city was filled with soldiers and the warehouses when opened disclosed large quantities of arms and ammunition. Silently and secretly Barrios had been preparing his plans. All the soldiers of the republic had been ordered to the capital on March 1.

The same night the official announcement was sent by telegram to the Presidents of Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. They were called upon to acknowledge the temporary supremacy of the Dictator Barrios and sign the articles of Confederation, which should form the Constitution of the Central American Union.

President Bogran of Honduras ordered the proclamation published and directed a message to the Congress asking its unconditional adhesion, which was decreed March 7.¹⁹⁸

Nicaragua boldly refused to recognize Barrios and rejected the plan of union. The policy of Nicaragua was controlled by a firm of British merchants at Leon, with which President Cardenas had a pecuniary interest, and which influenced his official acts.¹⁹⁹

The President of Costa Rica telegraphed Barrios that she wanted no union with the other Central American

¹⁹⁵ Leon, p. 70.

¹⁹⁶ For digest of proclamation, see Bancroft v. 3, p. 444.

¹⁹⁷ Curtis *Sp. Am. Capitals*, p. 111.

¹⁹⁸ Leon, p. 71. Bancroft, v. 8, p. 445.

¹⁹⁹ Curtis, p. 245.

states, that she was satisfied with her own independence and recognized no dictator.

Zaldivar delayed. In person he delivered a speech in front of the presidential palace to deceive the crowd. He used the press in the most violent manner. It talked only of conquest in hot and personal tones, of the loss of autonomy and of the subjection of Salvador to the power and despotic will of Barrios. These things were repeated daily in a multitude of handbills which were published with superior authorization and scattered through all the country. Zaldivar turned to his old friends, the Conservatives of the school of Carrera from whom he had lapsed temporarily. He owed his power solely to the good faith and sincerity of Barrios; alone he could not have obtained a single vote for the presidency of the republic. His gratitude was so soon exhausted, his promises so early forgotten.

In a telegram, March 6, Zaldivar congratulated General Barrios and the nation for the decree which he had issued concerning nationality.²⁰⁰ Two days later, March 8, Barrios said in reply,

You who in your telegram two days ago still say you are with me and will share my fate, you who have shown yourself the most enthusiastic and friendly and whom I could have expected to at once issue a decree of adhesion, should know that my determination is irrevocable and all that cannot forthwith support the idea I have proclaimed, will only serve to involve all the country in a great revolution, for which I shall hold you, and only you and your circle responsible to Central America.²⁰¹

March 7, the following telegram was sent to Bogran, President of Honduras, by Zaldivar:

El General Barrios me participa que ha dado el decree de Union de Centro America, asumiendo el mando militar. Digame U. que piensa; no debemos dejar solo al amigo Barrios.

Su afectisimo, R. ZALDIVAR.

(General Barrios informs me that he has issued the decree of the Central American Union, assuming the military command. Tell me what you think. We ought not to leave friend Barrios alone.)

²⁰⁰ *For. Rel.*, 1885, p. 86.

²⁰¹ *For. Rel.*, 1885, pp. 74-75.

Bogran interpreted that dispatch as a declaration of Zaldivar that he intended to aid Barrios with the power at his disposal.

Seven days later, Bogran was informed that the Union was opposed by the Salvadorean people, and that Zaldivar would be forced to bow to public opinion and separate from Barrios. It was further falsely stated that the government of the United States had protested against the decree of union and had ordered a part of its navy to Central American ports, and that Mexico was mobilizing forces on the Guatemalan frontier.²⁰² The same day, March 14, the Congress of Salvador in extraordinary session called by Zaldivar, was told of the proclamation of February 28, and that Costa Rica and Nicaragua had made common cause against it.

March 7, Barrios notified President Diaz of Mexico of the proclamation.²⁰³

Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica immediately (March 9) protested to Mexico and the United States. The tenth, Diaz protested to Barrios regarding the situation as an "emergency which is a menace against the independence and autonomy of the nationalities of the continent." Ignacio Mariscal, Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, declared that the official action of Mexico had not been directed to favor nor hinder the project of the Union of Central America; but that Mexico could not recognize the right to use force in face of the protest of the states involved, which were determined to fight for independence.²⁰⁴

²⁰² Leon, p. 80.

²⁰³ Leon, p. 81.

A Pres. De los Estados Unidos Mexico.

Circunstancias que por el proximo Mexico correo tendre la honra de dar a conocer a Vuestra Excelencia, me decidieron a proclamar, de acuerdo con la asamblea, la Union de los Estados de Centro America en una sola Republica, y asumir, para realizarla, el caracter de Supremo Jefe Militar.

De Vuestra Excelencia adicto servidor y amigo.

El presidente de Guatemala

RUFFINO BARRIOS.

²⁰⁴ Leon, pp. 7, 14. Bancroft, v. 8, pp. 448.

President Diaz ordered an army into the field. Always jealous of Guatemala, the boundary line having for a long time been unsettled, a rich tract of country being involved in the dispute, Mexico was prepared to resist the plans of Barrios, who appealed to the United States and Europe for approval. He had received encouragement from Mr. Blaine while on a visit to Washington, during President Garfield's administration. The personal interviews over his plan to reorganize the Central American Confederation were followed by an extended correspondence. No one was more fully informed of his aims than Mr. Henry C. Hall, the United States minister at Guatemala. But the cable to the United States and Europe landed at La Libertad, the principal port of Salvador, and was under the control of that republic. This may have been the greatest obstacle to Barrios's success, for none of his messages reached their destinations; they were seized by the order of Zaldivar and suppressed.

Barrios took pains to inform the foreign powers fully of his plans and the motives which prompted them, and to each he repeated the assurance that he was not inspired by personal ambition and would accept only a temporary dictatorship. As soon as a constitutional convention of delegates from the several Republics could assemble, he would retire and permit the choice of a President of the consolidated Republics by a popular election he himself under no circumstances to be a candidate.²⁰⁵

In place of the suppressed messages, Zaldivar sent a series of dispatches, misrepresenting the situation and applying for protection against the tyranny of Barrios. The doctored replies of the foreign nations, the comment of the press, and the bogus bulletins, deceived the people. The Salvadoreans were led to believe that several troop-transports had left New Orleans for the east coast of Nicaragua and Honduras. Fearing a contest with the forces of Europe and the United States as the price of submission to Barrios, the people of Salvador and Nicaragua supported Zaldivar in his treachery. In Guatemala there was also a reversion of feeling against the government. The finan-

²⁰⁵ Critchfield *Am. Supremacy*, p. 245. See Bancroft, v. 8, p. 447.

cial backers of the President withdrew their promises, and the people gradually lost confidence in their hero. The diplomatic corps received no instructions from home. The German, French, and United States ministers were favorable to the plans of Barrios; the Spanish minister was outspoken in his opposition, and the English and Italian ministers were non-committal. They received no replies to repeated messages to their governments. Mr. Hall, the American minister, transmitted a full description of the situation every evening and begged for instructions, but none came.²⁰⁶

Barrios decided to take the offensive before Zaldivar could invade Guatemala. The decision of the Dictator to accompany his troops was fatal.

An accident in the theatre the night before he started may have determined the issue. A large screen of sheeting was elaborately painted with the inscription,

“All hail the Union of the Republic!
Long live the Dictator of the Generalissimo,
J. Ruffino Barrios!”

The curtain fell from its support, and a tear through the name, Barrios, so affected the superstitious people that none of them supposed he would return alive. “All but himself had lost confidence, and it transpired that even he went to the front with a presentiment of disaster, for among his papers was found his will, written by himself a few moments before his departure.”²⁰⁷

Three battles were fought, El Coco, San Lorenzo, and Chalchuapa. The following message announces the tragedy of the latter conflict:

To the President of Mexico: Barrios killed in action at Chalchuapa. Triumph complete! Viva Centro-America libre!

ZALDIVAR, *President of Salvador*.²⁰⁸

April 3, the assembly of Guatemala annulled the decree of February 28. In view of this action, the diplomatic corps proposed a truce. Peace was signed between Hon-

²⁰⁶ Curtis, p. 111.

²⁰⁷ Curtis, pp. 111, 112.

²⁰⁸ Leon, p. 26.

duras, Nicaragua, Salvador, and Costa Rica, April 12, 1888, and peace between Salvador and Guatemala, April 19.²⁰⁹

The tragic defeat of Barrios was due more to the treachery of Zaldivar than to any one other cause. Had the President of Salvador been faithful to his promise the ideal of Barrios might have been realized. The time was ripe for union, the atmosphere was charged with the spirit of federation. Barrios was on good terms with all the republics. Salvador had presented him with a sword of honor as a token of her esteem. Costa Rica had made him a general in her army in recognition of her friendship. His rule over Guatemala was absolute and the preparation for the coup d'état was skillfully carried through. No one cares to deny the cruelties that marred the rule of the champion of Federation, although few would agree that he was "the most cruel and sanguinary monster that America has produced,"²¹⁰ or that "the atrocities committed by this human tiger were equal to any recorded of Ancient Roman despots."²¹¹

The overthrow of the Creoles, who had held the reins of power in Guatemala from 1842 to 1871 was the signal for the outburst of the worst of slanders against the representative of the Mongrel race, who became dominant. It was said that he proposed to "wipe out the Creole race—not content with wreaking his ferocity on men, he had the wives and daughters of his enemies exposed stark naked in cages." The Conservatives nicknamed him, the "Panther of San Marco" from his native village.²¹² Many acts of despotism were rightly imputed to Barrios, but he was not the "jacketed Caligula," his enemies proclaimed as the destroyer of his country's welfare. The testimony of the liberal part of the Central American press is in his favor. The witness of foreign travellers and property-holders, native and foreign, is also favorable.²¹³

²⁰⁹ *For. Rel.*, 1885, p. 86.

²¹⁰ *For. Rel.*, 1886., p. 65.

²¹¹ Caivano. Tommaso, *Il Guat. Review in Nation*, February 20, 1896, p. 153.

²¹² Caivano, Tommaso, *Il Guat. Review in Nation*, February 20, 1896, p. 154.

²¹³ *Pan. Star and Herald*, Han. 12, 14, 1875. Bancroft, v. 3, pp. 431, 432.

The energy and iron will of this unfortunate leader have been generally recognized. Whatever his personal character may have been, his country owes much to him, who without any claim to enlightenment, or to a knowledge of public affairs, wrought wonders for liberal institutions, internal peace, and the advancement of intellectual pursuits, industries, and wealth. He gave liberty to the press, built railroads, reorganized the telegraph and postal systems, improved roads and bridges, and did much for education in the schools and colleges. His capital became a clean, healthy, well-policed, and well-administered city. He perfected the military organization, and rid the country of the tyranny of the Church.²¹⁴ Barrios was ambitious as others had been before him, but he was ambitious to extend over all Central America the enlightened and progressive rule he had given to Guatemala. Diaz had established his sway in the neighboring state to the north and Barrios knew that in Central America, only the personal supremacy of a strong administrator could secure the desired end. It is to his credit that he first sought to bring about the union by the willing coöperation of the Republics. Only when diplomacy and negotiation failed did he rely on the coup d'état, which he was prepared to support with his army and his life. A recent writer has clearly stated the issue of the tragic defeat:

Thus perished the one man in Central America who was able to unite its petty states anew under one strong rule. He has not the elevated character, the personal integrity, and the aversion to harsh and cruel measures of President Diaz, but that he would have governed Central America with justice, ability, and statesmanlike breadth, none could doubt. But whether he would have laid the foundation of a new nation is quite a different question. Even in Mexico anarchy and revolution were the order of things when the strong and beneficent rule of the last quarter of a Century came to an end. In Central America, where jealousies and petty warfares have raged for three quarters of a century and where revolutions are an every day occurrence, the difficulties in the way of national unity are even greater than in the Mexican Republic. Yet even so the death of Barrios was a public calamity, and was the occasion of deep and genuine sorrow throughout all the Central American republics.²¹⁵

²¹⁴ Sears, p. 496.

²¹⁵ Leon, p. 498.